



ATTITUDES TOWARDS NATIONAL IDENTITY, IMMIGRATION, AND REFUGEES IN GERMANY

JULY 2017



More in
Common



About More in Common

More in Common is a new effort to build communities and societies that are stronger, more resilient and more open. The More in Common initiative took shape from work undertaken since 2015 to understand why advanced democracies failed to respond more effectively to the refugee crisis and its impact on domestic politics.

The refugee crisis was a harbinger of what happens when the forces of right-wing populist hate and division gain the upper hand, and those in favour of open and diverse societies do not come together in defence of those values. If the battle for hearts and minds is lost to authoritarian populists, advanced democracies will not be able to respond adequately to such profound collective challenges as climate change, inequality, technological disruption of the job market, population ageing and global public health threats. Holding diverse and inclusive societies together will become increasingly difficult. More in Common's objective across its different streams of work is to build closer and more inclusive societies, which are resilient to the appeal of xenophobia and authoritarian populism. We aim to support the efforts of civil society and key influencers who share the values of open and inclusive societies, and help catalyse other new initiatives that advance these values.

More in Common is a non-profit organisation incubated by Purpose Europe. Purpose builds and supports movements to advance the fight for an open, just, and habitable world. The co-founders of More in Common are Brendan Cox, Tim Dixon, Mathieu Lefevre, and Gemma Mortensen.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



At a time of major political disruptions and a widespread public sense of frustration with the political status quo, Germany stands out from other European Countries. Its political leadership has remained stable, it has championed internationalist values, and has been a model for other countries in its response to the global refugee crisis. The world has more refugees than at any time since the Second World War, yet only a few of the world's high income economies have significantly increased their refugee intake. Germany has come to embody the values behind the international system of refugee protection after welcoming an estimated one million refugees during 2015 alone. This also made Germany an attractive target for right-wing populism. For example, in January 2017, President Donald Trump, described Chancellor Merkel's decision to welcome refugees as a "catastrophic mistake" that is "ruining Germany".

The perceived success or failure of refugee integration – measured perhaps more than anything else by the judgment of Germans themselves – will therefore have a major influence on the global refugee debate and the future policies of many countries. Since 2015, the German public's response to the large refugee intake has been a regular subject of media reports. In September 2015, Germans initially welcomed refugees with an enthusiasm reminiscent of the excitement around German reunification a quarter of century before. While that excitement could never be sustained, media reports have portrayed contrasting pictures of public opinion trends. Some reports have suggested that the public remains strongly supportive of the refugee intake, while others have pointed to signs of rising public anxieties and regret. Integrating the large number of refugees has posed many challenges, resulting from gaps in language skills, cultural differences and the psychological damage suffered by many refugees. The far-right party Alternative for Germany party ('Alternative für Deutschland', AfD), has campaigned on an 'anti-politics' and anti-immigration platform, capitalising on public anxieties and on incidents such as the Christmas market attack in late 2016. While AfD's polling is well short of many other far-right parties in Europe, its growth has posed a threat to the traditionally consensus-oriented, centrist nature of German political debate.

A better evidence base to understand public opinion in Germany is needed, both to provide a context for sometimes conflicting evidence and to provide practical guidance for efforts to foster the successful integration of refugees and social inclusion. This report aims to contribute to building this evidence base. By better understanding the values, concerns and priorities of different segments of German society, those with a voice in the public debate in Germany can become more effective in their communications efforts. In particular, they can counter the increasingly well-organised and coordinated forces of the far right, who pose a serious threat to democratic norms and to the values of open and inclusive society.

The Limitations of Existing Public Opinion Research

This report aims to fill a gap in public opinion research in Germany that has been published to date. The existing body of survey data has many limitations. First, many studies ask only a small range of direct questions, which provide some understanding but little explanatory insight. Others go further by making associations with social and economic issues, or demographic and psychographic factors such as values and levels of awareness. Few have attempted to build a more complete picture of how views on specific issues come together in the minds of Germans, or to explore the interconnected nature of attitudes towards German national identity, immigration and the refugee intake.

Media coverage often focuses on Germans at the opposite ends of the spectrum - those with cosmopolitan values who have enthusiastically participated in the 'welcoming culture' ('Willkommenskultur') and others who advocate closing Germany's borders and who support far-right parties such as the AfD. Much less attention

has been paid to the large number of Germans who hold mixed views about their country's refugee intake, its immigration policies and Germany's place in the world. This report suggests that the majority of Germans belong to groups with mixed views (sometimes described as the 'conflicted middle' or 'anxious middle'). Further, many of them are open to changing their views if presented with persuasive arguments – but existing research has not identified the populations that are most open to changing their views, the messaging that would be most persuasive, or the most trusted messengers.

Research Methodology

This study employs a population clustering segmentation analysis method that draws on a range of attitudinal characteristics of the German public. This form of segmentation provides a rich composite picture of how a population is divided in its views, going beyond basic demographic factors to show how networks of attitudes and opinions are connected. It identifies the profile of the population segment most ready to take action to support refugees and immigrants; the profile of those most hostile; and the profile of the groups with mixed views, including the sub-group of those who are most open to change their minds.

The first phase of the research was undertaken through an online survey from 20th to 27th of September 2016, with a representative sample of 2,002 adults. Respondents answered questions relating to their demographic characteristics, including gender, age, geography, educational level, income, ethnicity, religious identity, and media consumption habits. They were then asked questions relating to the issues of greatest concern to them, their political views and affiliations, familiarity with refugee and immigration issues, their understanding of different terminology in the refugee and migration debate, their personal experience with refugees and their responses to different policy approaches and messages. In this research, message testing was also conducted to assess what messages are more convincing and likely to increase support for refugees and open societies. As an experimental phase, the study included an innovative implicit association test with the term 'refugees', which is explored in depth in the appendix. In the second phase of the research, a set of two focus groups conducted among key segments identified in the poll was undertaken in Berlin in December 2016. The focus groups allowed for observation of in-person responses to messages and policy initiatives. Civil Society meetings were hosted in November 2016 and February 2017.

Detailed cross-tabulation of the survey results has identified five 'segments' of opinion with common perspectives within the population. This provides insights into the connections between different influences on public opinion ranging from basic sociodemographic factors, to attitudes towards a wide range of issues. A similar segmentation methodology was used in the 2011 and 2016 Fear and Hope reports¹ in the United Kingdom, which grouped the English population according to their attitudes towards immigration.

While this research has value in contributing to a better understanding of public opinion on a complex set of issues, we recognise that it has some limitations. Further research is needed to test many of the inferences from the data. We plan to conduct more qualitative research among the segments identified in the report, and hope that a similar study can be conducted again in the future to track changes in public attitudes over time. Most of all, however, our goal is to provide practical guidance to those making the case for an open, inclusive society that values diversity and embraces humanitarian values, including the protection of refugees. More in Common is grateful for the input and support of the Social Change Initiative, the generous funding provided by the Human Dignity Foundation for the research, and the support of Purpose, the organization that has incubated More in Common. We thank Ipsos MORI for the excellent work reflected in this report, and look forward to collaborating on similar reports in other countries. The study has been undertaken in collaboration with Professor Marc Helbing at the University of Bamberg, and with valuable advice and input from German civil society groups.

FINDINGS: NUANCE AND OPPORTUNITY BEYOND 'FOR AND AGAINST'

In overall terms, the survey highlighted nine key findings:


¹Lowles, Nick and Anthony Painter (2011, 2016): Fear and Hope: ... [see page 67 for further details]

1. **More Germans are optimists than pessimists.** Most feel that their personal situation has remained largely unchanged in recent years, and around half expect it to remain the same in the future. Those expecting an improvement outnumber those expecting deterioration by a margin of 29 to 17 per cent.
2. **Immigration ranks high among the most important issues** facing Germany today (cited by 45 per cent of those surveyed), **but poverty and social inequality rank even higher** (at 50 per cent).
3. **Anti-immigration sentiment is present in Germany, but it is not strong.** Only 8 per cent of Germans regard the impact of immigration on Germany as “very negative” and those who believe that it has had a positive effect outnumber those who believe it has had a negative effect by 31-28 per cent. 40 per cent said that its overall impact has been neither positive nor negative.
4. **An overwhelming number of Germans believe in the obligation of countries to accept refugees.** 69 per cent believe that people should be able to seek refuge in other countries, including Germany, to escape war and persecution, and only 8 per cent reject this view.
5. **One of the greatest concerns among the public is whether refugees will integrate successfully into German society.** 46 per cent of Germans lack confidence that refugees will integrate successfully, whereas only 23 per cent say they are confident of successful integration.
6. **Germans have reservations about the compatibility of German culture with the values of the Muslim faith.** For example, 49 per cent believe that most Muslims in Germany would prefer to live by Sharia law than according to German law (and only 19 per cent disagree).
7. **The most convincing messages are those that build on values of shared humanity and inclusive patriotism.**
8. **The overwhelming majority of German people see themselves in the political centre,** even if they support the AfD. Around two thirds of Germans identify themselves with a political party.
9. **Most Germans feel a need to help refugees.** 40 per cent have helped refugees over the course of the last year, mostly through the donation of clothing and food. Most expressed interest in additional support if barriers to help were lower.

Segmentation

The segmentation analysis, based on people’s attitudes towards immigrants and refugees, identified five distinct segments in Germany (see Figure 1). These segments are located between two extremes: one containing respondents who are strongly opposed to immigration and the welcome of refugees, and another that includes respondents with the most liberal attitudes. The three remaining segments can be distinguished according to the respondents’ assessment of the economic and cultural effects of immigration. Segments can also be differentiated when considering Germans’ sense of moral obligation towards refugees.

FIGURE 1: OVERVIEW OF THE SEGMENTS



Data: In per cent.

Basis: n=2,002 persons polled, including 347 Radical Opponents, 363 Moderate Opponents, 462 Humanitarian Sceptics, 395 Economic Pragmatists and 435 Liberal Cosmopolitans.

Source: Segmentation on the basis of an Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

The Outliers

LIBERAL COSMOPOLITANS ('LIBERALE WELTBÜRGER') - 22 PER CENT

Liberal Cosmopolitans represent 22 per cent of the German population. They are more open-minded, pro-refugee and supportive of immigration than other segments. They perceive immigration as good for both the economy and cultural life. They believe immigrants are willing to integrate and that refugees will successfully integrate into German society. These convictions lead the Liberal Cosmopolitans to be more active than any other group in volunteering to provide practical assistance to refugees (21 per cent being volunteers). They believe that refugees should be allowed to live permanently in Germany.

Demographics: Liberal Cosmopolitans come from all age groups and are most often found in larger cities such as Berlin and Hamburg. They generally have higher educational levels, often either holding university degrees or are currently studying. Liberal Cosmopolitans identify with the SPD, the Green Party, the Left Party and the Pirate Party. Many come from families that have a recent history of migration.

RADICAL OPPONENTS ('RADIKALE GEGNER') - 17 PER CENT

At the other end of the spectrum, Radical Opponents represent 17 per cent of the German population. They are the group most opposed to refugees and migration. Radical Opponents believe that letting refugees into Germany is a security risk and will encourage many more to come to Europe. They are convinced that most refugees are not really refugees, but come for economic reasons. They do not think that most immigrants are willing to integrate into German society and as a result believe that refugees should not be permitted to live permanently in Germany.

More generally, Radical Opponents reflect many of the characteristics of the “left behind” groups identified as the most likely supporters of far-right populist parties around the world. They believe that globalisation has had negative impacts both for themselves and for Germany. They perceive immigrants as a burden on public services and feel strongly that Germany’s identity is disappearing. They demand a closure of the borders.

Demographics: Radical Opponents are a somewhat older subset of the population, with medium and lower levels of education and lower incomes. They identify themselves with the far-right AfD, the NPD or no political party at all. They are more often found in smaller communities, especially in East Germany as well as in Saarland and Rhineland-Palatinate. They tend not to identify with any religious denomination.

The Conflicted Middle

ECONOMIC PRAGMATISTS ('WIRTSCHAFTLICHE PRAGMATIKER') - 20 PER CENT

Economic Pragmatists make up 20 per cent of the German population. They take pride in their identity as Germans and generally have a positive outlook for their future. A high proportion of them believe that immigration makes Germany more open to new ideas and cultures. However, they are also concerned about the compatibility of the Islamic faith with German culture. They do not think that refugees should be permitted to live permanently in Germany.

Demographics: Economic Pragmatists can be found across age groups. They are more common in the east and the Saarland. They tend to have medium educational levels and medium to high incomes. The group has a relatively high proportion of people who were not born in Germany or whose parents were born abroad. Economic Pragmatists are affiliated mostly with one of the two major parties (the CDU/CSU and the SPD).

HUMANITARIAN SCEPTICS ('HUMANITÄRE SKEPTIKER') - 21 PER CENT

Humanitarian Sceptics make up 21 per cent of the German population. They see accepting refugees as an obligation and a matter of principle, perhaps especially due to Germany’s history. However, they have reservations and conflicted feelings about the integration of refugees. They believe that European countries have a responsibility for the wars in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq and their consequences. Yet they have doubts that most refugees will successfully integrate into German society. They therefore are less likely to

believe that refugees should be permitted to live permanently in Germany. Humanitarian Sceptics do not see the closure of borders as an option.

Demographics: Humanitarian Sceptics are the oldest segment in Germany, with many of them in their 60s and older. They are more likely to live in medium-sized cities such as Bremen and Hessen. While they are highly educated, many have low incomes. They identify the most with the CDU/CSU, FDP and Left Party.


MODERATE OPPONENTS ('GEMÄSSIGTE GEGNER') - 18 PER CENT

As 18 per cent of the German population, Moderate Opponents have deep reservations about Germany's refugee intake. They question whether refugees arriving in Germany are genuinely fleeing war. They also believe there are security risks in accommodating refugees and they worry that immigrants benefit from public services disproportionately. They also hold negative views towards Islam. They think refugees should not be permitted to live permanently in Germany and a significant proportion of them support a closure of borders. While they share many of the same views as the Radical Opponents, they do not hold those views with the same levels of intensity.

Demographics: Moderate Opponents are found among all age groups, although with a higher number of retired and self-employed people. They tend to live in medium-sized communities and have an intermediate educational level. A high proportion of Modersate Opponents live in the states of Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg and Bremen. Overall, they have low incomes. Most Moderate Opponents do not feel close to any party, although some identify with the AfD and NPD.

FIGURE 2: EXTREMISM

Refugees coming to Europe nowadays are more likely to become extremists than German Muslims



Representation of the Top 2 boxes (strongly agree / tend to agree) in per cent.

Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

Substantive Differences: German Landscape, Immigration, Muslims and Refugees

GERMAN LANDSCAPE

A clear finding from the segmentation exercise is that attitudes towards the refugee crisis are part of a much broader debate about how Germany ought to engage with the outside world. In general, those who favour the status quo of integration with Europe and participation in a globalised economy are supportive of assisting refugees. Conversely, those who are Sceptical of the globalisation see refugee policy as a part of a flawed system that has made them – and the country – worse off.

First, support for refugees is related to attitudes towards the economic impact of globalisation. Two-thirds of Radical Opponents (65 per cent) believe that the economic consequences of globalisation have been “very negative” for Germany. Meanwhile, only about one in five (18 per cent) of Liberal Cosmopolitans and

Humanitarian Sceptics (21 per cent) agree. The other segments fall between these two extremes.

Second, these economic concerns translate, albeit to a lesser extent, to Germans' perception of their own future. When asked about how they expect the next five years to affect them personally, about half of Germans across all segments reply that they expect to be 'about the same'. However, the Liberal Cosmopolitans are twice as likely (38 per cent) as Radical Opponents (19 per cent) to say that they expect to be personally better off. Conversely, the Radical Opponents are about three times as likely (30 per cent) as Liberal Cosmopolitans (11 per cent) to say that they expect to be personally worse off in five years. Again, all the Conflicted Middle groups fall in between.


Third, fears and "feelings of loss" are felt beyond the economy. A significant portion of the public expresses concern that Germany's openness to outside cultures is impacting its cultural life. An overwhelming majority of Radical Opponents (84 per cent) and a substantial majority of Moderate Opponents (62 per cent) agree that 'Germany's identity is disappearing nowadays'. But there is no consensus on this question: Economic Pragmatists are evenly split (51 per cent agree) and lower numbers of Humanitarian Sceptics (42 per cent) agree. Only one-quarter of Liberal Cosmopolitans (24 per cent) express agreement with this observation.

Finally, asking Germans about the most important issues facing the country provides insight into their differing perceptions of the refugee crisis and migration more generally. Almost half of the German population (45 per cent) rank 'immigration' as a top concern. This is especially true for Radical Opponents, of whom two-thirds (67 per cent) of the group cite it as one of Germany's top three issues. By contrast, only about one-fifth (22 per cent) of Liberal Cosmopolitans view it as a leading concern. To Liberal Cosmopolitans, it is not the newcomers who pose a challenge, it is the German response that is problematic: 56 per cent of them cite 'racism and discrimination' as a leading concern. Just 8 per cent of Radical Opponents agree that racism and discrimination is a top concern. On this matter, Liberal Cosmopolitans hold the fringe opinion: while 45 per cent of all Germans cite 'immigration' as one of the top three issues facing Germany, just 28 per cent list 'racism and discrimination'.


Taken together, these findings make it clear that communications around refugee policy must be understood as forming part of a broader economic and social debate about Germany's openness to Europe and the world beyond.

FIGURE 3: MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES

Question: Which three of the following do you see as the most important issues facing Germany today?



IMMIGRATION



Representation of the Top 2 boxes (strongly agree / tend to agree) in per cent.
Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

Second, these economic concerns translate, albeit to a lesser extent, to Germans' perception of their own future. When asked about how they expect the next five years will affect them personally, about half of Germans across all segments reply that they expect to be 'about the same'. However, the Liberal Cosmopolitans are twice as likely (38 per cent) as Radical Opponents (19 per cent) to say that they expect to be personally better off. Conversely, the Radical Opponents are about three times as likely (30 per cent) as Liberal Cosmopolitans (11 per cent) to say that they expect to be personally worse off in five years. Again, all the Conflicted Middle groups fall in between.

Third, people report a loss of belonging and identity that goes beyond economic anxieties. A significant portion of the public expresses concern that Germany's openness to outside cultures is impacting its cultural life. An overwhelming majority of Radical Opponents (84 per cent) and substantial majority of Moderate Opponents (62 per cent) agree that 'Germany's identity is disappearing nowadays'. But there is no consensus on this question: Economic Pragmatists are evenly split (51 per cent agree) and lower numbers of Humanitarian Sceptics (42 per cent) agree. Only one-quarter of Liberal Cosmopolitans (24 per cent) express agreement with this observation.

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VIEWS ON IMMIGRATION

By definition, refugees are distinct from immigrants in that they have fled their home country as a result of war or persecution. Given this distinction, one might expect that refugees would be understood and received differently from the broader category of immigrants, who enter a new country for a range of motivating factors. This is not the case in Germany. Across all relevant questions, attitudes to immigrants correlate strongly with views on the incoming refugee population.

General attitudes towards immigration in Germany are mixed. Asked about immigration's impact on their country, Germans are split three ways: positive (31 per cent), neither positive nor negative (40 per cent), and negative (28 per cent). Liberal Cosmopolitans are an outlier again on this question, with 69 per cent expressing the view that immigration has been positive. Humanitarian Sceptics, Moderate Opponents, and Radical Opponents are all of the opposite view, with just 19 per cent, 8 per cent, and 6 per cent reporting positive views, respectively. Economic Pragmatists are caught in the middle, with 46 per cent believing that immigration has had a positive impact.

At least two factors contribute heavily to negative and positive perceptions of immigrants. The first is whether immigrants are seen as making efforts to integrate. Here both Liberal Cosmopolitans (80 per cent) and Economic Pragmatists (76 per cent) agree that immigrants make an effort to integrate into German society. By contrast, less than one-third of Humanitarian Sceptics (32 per cent), Moderate Opponents (20 per cent), and Radical Opponents (9 per cent) agree. This is important, as efforts to integrate can be interpreted as signs of respect and gratitude for the hosts and their culture.


A second critical factor in shaping how Germans perceive immigrants is whether they see them as primarily contributing value or extracting value from society. When asked whether immigrants 'claim benefits and use public services even though they've contributed nothing in return,' Radical (74 per cent) and Moderate Opponents (72 per cent) tend to overwhelmingly agree. However, in contrast to views of integration, Humanitarian Sceptics (30 per cent) are aligned with the Liberal Cosmopolitans (11 per cent) and Economic Pragmatists (23 per cent) in having low levels of agreement with this claim. These questions reveal the ambivalence and uncertainty felt by Humanitarian Sceptics about immigration, which extends to refugees.

These findings likely indicate that refugees are not always perceived as a distinct population from immigrants, but rather as part of a collective group of newcomers to Germany, which are treated with a mixture of appreciation, concern, and resentment.

FIGURE 4: INTEGRATION EFFORTS

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

GENERALLY, IMMIGRANTS MAKE EFFORTS TO INTEGRATE INTO GERMAN SOCIETY.



Representation of the Top 2 boxes (strongly agree / tend to agree) in per cent.

Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

PERCEPTION OF MUSLIMS

With refugees entering Germany from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, among other countries, Germans' perception of refugees is inherently related to their perception of Muslims more generally. A clear pattern becomes evident: Liberal Cosmopolitans have a positive and confident view of Muslims, Humanitarian Sceptics show high levels of uncertainty and ambivalence, while Economic Pragmatists, Moderate and Radical Opponents voice high levels of concern.


This division is seen on the subject of whether most Muslims in Germany would rather live under Islamic or Sharia law, rather than German law. Overall, nearly half of Germans (49 per cent) believe that this is the preference of most Muslims in Germany, with an additional one-third reporting that they either don't know (11 per cent) or have no opinion (21 per cent). The outlier is the Liberal Cosmopolitan group, of whom only 14 per cent believe Sharia law is preferred by most. The other segments feel quite differently about the question, with majorities agreeing among the Economic Pragmatists (64 per cent), the Moderate Opponents (59 per cent), and the Radical Opponents (83 per cent).

Similar trends are visible on the critical subject of whether Islam and German society are 'incompatible'. The division here is even starker, with just one in eleven Liberal Cosmopolitans (9 per cent) believing the two to be incompatible, compared to 84 per cent of Radical Opponents. More fundamentally, when asked if 'Muslims hold similar values to me personally,' only Liberal Cosmopolitans agree. While 71 per cent of Liberal Cosmopolitans believe that Muslims share values with them, less than 20 per cent of each of the other four segments agrees (see Figure 5).

FIGURE 5: VALUES OF MUSLIMS

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

MOST MUSLIMS HOLD SIMILAR VALUES TO ME PERSONALLY.



Representation of the Top 2 boxes (strongly agree / tend to agree) in per cent.

Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

The debate surrounding refugees and their integration into German society cannot be fully understood without taking into account perceptions of Muslims. Unfamiliarity with Muslim beliefs and practices, and fear associated with their differences and perceived possible threats to Germany, are likely to act as an obstacle to a broad consensus to fully embrace the current population of refugees. These concerns are also likely to continue being exploited by far-right political forces.

ATTITUDES TO REFUGEES

The survey results suggest that most Germans do not have simplistic attitudes towards the incoming refugee population. Instead, responses to the refugee crisis reflect a complex combination of feelings of obligation,

scepticism, fear, empathy and guilt.

Germans are divided on whether their country is doing enough to help the refugees that are entering the country. Nearly equal numbers believe that the government should be doing more (35 per cent) as believe that it is currently doing enough (37 per cent). Just 18 per cent believe the government should be doing less. A majority (60 per cent) of Liberal Cosmopolitans believe more should be done, a view held by between 19 and 35 per cent of the other segments.


A central question is whether Germans believe that they have a duty or obligation to incoming refugees. Indeed, two-thirds (69 per cent) of Germans believe that 'people should be able to take refuge in other countries, including Germany, to escape from war or persecution'. This obligation can be conceived in several forms, related to the severity of refugees' circumstances, according to Germany's traditions, or due to its capacity to provide for those in need. Each of these was tested, and the strongest frame for this responsibility was: "European countries are responsible for the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. They should therefore play their part by accepting refugees." A majority of Germans agreed with this message (56 per cent), including 43 per cent of Radical Opponents.

However, against this motivation rests several strongly held concerns that are specific to the refugee population. One is the popular belief that 'most foreigners' entering the country are not genuine refugees, but actually 'just want to come for economic reasons.' This is a view held by a majority of both Moderate Opponents (64 per cent) and Radical Opponents (84 per cent). Another major concern is that welcoming refugees 'will encourage many more people...to move to Europe also.' This ubiquitous concern is held by 68 per cent of Germans, including a majority of all segments, with the exception of Liberal Cosmopolitans - among whom 45 per cent agreed.

FIGURE 6: NO REAL REFUGEES

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

**MOST FOREIGNERS WHO WANT TO GET INTO MY COUNTRY AS REFUGEES
AREN'T REALLY REFUGEES. THEY JUST WANT TO COME HERE FOR ECONOMIC REASONS,
OR TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR WELFARE SERVICE.**



Representation of the Top 2 boxes (strongly agree / tend to agree) in per cent.

Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

A substantial majority of Germans believe, in principle, that those fleeing war and persecution should be able to find refuge in Germany. Nevertheless, concerns about refugee integration, immigration and Islam are held by both Moderate and Radical Opponent groups, with varying levels of sympathy from Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists. In navigating this complex arena, communications about refugees must also speak to additional concerns about maintaining order in Germany's immigration policies. These concerns

are reflected in fears that refugees do not have legitimate claims and the possibility that welcoming refugees into Germany will attract more inflows from other places.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The goal of the research study and this report is to help support efforts to build more effective communications by public voices, whether they are in government, business or in civil society and, ultimately, effectively counter the appeal of authoritarian populism. We believe that the research methodology of population segmentation produces new, valuable and actionable insights into public attitudes on a complex range of issues about identity, immigrants and refugees. In particular, the fact that over 50 per cent of Germans are in one of three 'conflicted middle' groups, highlights the need to focus communications efforts towards those groups, and not to make assumptions about their views or beliefs.

In terms of specific strategies:

- Liberal Cosmopolitans are the group most ready to engage and be mobilised to take action in support of refugees. However, given the significant differences in the values and outlook of the Liberal Cosmopolitans compared to other segments, they may not be the most effective vehicles for persuading other population groups.
- Economic Pragmatists need reassurance that the government is controlling the refugee intake and integration process.
- Humanitarian Sceptics will be responsive to both appeals to moral obligation and examples of refugees integrating successfully into German society.
- Moderate Opponents demonstrate less extreme views and behaviours than the Radical Opponents. This group is unlikely to be an early target of communication efforts, since they are hard to reach and persuade. However, this group is the softest target for far-right forces that want to expand the pool of Radical Opponents. Therefore, greater efforts are needed to reduce the allure of extremism and hate to the Moderate Opponents in ways that reach this segment and speak to their genuine concerns.

In terms of larger-scale communications, the research suggests that there are several messages that can be effective in reaching mainstream audiences, especially those that emphasise shared humanity and culture. On the other hand, economic arguments are less effective.

This research was commissioned by More in Common in conjunction with the Social Change Initiative. We have commissioned similar research in France. More in Common's research program extends across Europe and the United States, with the goal of covering six countries by early 2018. Both SCI and More in Common plan on taking the research further in a number of other countries. Within Germany, we plan to build on the findings in this report with a program of ongoing qualitative research and support for civil society groups. We also plan to apply many of the insights from this research to practical efforts through communications and community based activities to build more inclusive and welcoming communities.

1. Introduction

Until the 1990s, immigration issues were scarcely on the public agenda and were very often excluded from open debate. Now **immigration** has become one of the **most important political issues** in western societies. Polls regularly make clear that the population considers immigration to be one of the most urgent problems politicians should solve. Voting research has also shown that attitudes towards immigrants have a decisive influence on party voting. This has also led to the various positionings of political parties in Germany being characterised increasingly by immigration topics. Also, in this context, new right-wing populist parties are making gains. They are often the only political actors who adopt a clear critical position towards liberal immigration and integration policies.

Since the 2000s, debates about immigration have focused strongly on **Muslim immigration**. In this respect, alongside the general challenges that all European states face due to immigration, there is often talk of a conflict of values and a security threat. In recent years, there has been a special focus on the wearing of the headscarf and veil, swimming instruction for Muslim girls, female genital mutilation, or circumcision for Muslim boys. Questions about cultural compatibility and integration play a very important role in the current refugee debate. It is clear, however, that this discourse is not new, but has only been intensified. Research is clarifying that intense debates about immigration occur when many immigrants arrive in a relatively short amount of time, no when the proportion of immigrants in a country is large.

While there has already been a great deal of research into attitudes towards immigrants, there has been very little examination of how people position themselves towards refugees and how attitudes differ towards refugees and immigrants. This is partly connected to the fact that it is disputed whether immigrants and refugees are perceived as two distinct categories within mainstream society or not.

As well as the reason for fleeing and humanitarian concerns, it has been shown that there is a preference for refugees with higher levels of education and those who can be more easily integrated into the employment market. There is also a preference for refugees with no Islamic background, as they are considered easier to integrate culturally. Due to a lack of comparative studies, the questions remain open whether attitudes towards refugees differ across states and to what extent the number of refugees accepted or the economic situation of a state plays a role. Of special interest is the question of whether refugees are more welcome in a country like Germany, which itself has a history marked by flight and expulsion.

Previously, immigration research has dealt, primarily, with the **integration of immigrants** who came to Western Europe and North America in the 1950s to 1970s, mainly for **economic reasons** from former colonies or applicant states. In the interim the **pattern of influx has significantly changed**. Muslim immigrants represent a special challenge for integration, their religion posing new challenges to western states. Another gap in the research is the fact that previously it was, first of all, the integration of immigrants who had already been living in a western country for some time that was studied. We know almost nothing about the integration process when a migrant has only just arrived. This problem is apparent in the current refugee debate in which there is a discussion of how refugees, which have prospects of remaining long-term, can be integrated quickly.

In this context, it is essential to deal with the attitudes of the population to immigrants in general and refugees in particular. This study examines how deeply the rejection of or support for immigration is anchored in Germany and in what ways the German population can be mobilised.

²See for example the monthly Ipsos polls "What worries the world", September 2016, available at: <http://www.ipsos.de/assets/files/presse/2016/Pressemitteilungen/Ipsos%20What%20Worries%20the%20World%20September%202016%20-%20Deutschland.pdf>, accessed on 8 December 2016.


2. Methodology

To research these questions, a **multi-stage study design** was developed, which included both quantitative and qualitative methods. This multi-stage process and the mixture of various survey methods made it possible to put together a comprehensive picture of public opinion in Germany on the subject of immigration and immigrants. The design consisted of three stages: First an online poll of the German population was conducted. Building on this, a segmentation was then carried out that made it possible to classify the population into various groups, each with similar values and attitudes. Two qualitative focus groups then took place with participants from two previously defined segments.

The first stage of the **online poll** was carried out between 20 and 27 September 2016. As part of this, 2,000 interviews were carried out within the German resident population aged between 18 and 70. This survey was aimed at establishing a comprehensive empirical picture of the population's views about immigration.

The **segmentation** that followed was intended to measure the attitudes of the German population multi-dimensionally and to better understand them. Segmentation is a multivariate analysis procedure whose main objective is to uncover various social groups, which demarcate themselves from one another in their heterogeneity, but which unite people with homogeneous values or needs (see Figure 7). Segments can be formed according to various perspectives, such as demographic (age, sex, household size), socio-economic (income, education) or also psychographic factors (lifestyle, attitude, values). Segmentation **on the basis of attitudes** was chosen for this study, the use of which enables typologies of social positions or attitudes to be formed, which are not based on purely objective criteria such as income or education level, but subjective attitudes. This differs from the segmentation of traditional horizontal analysis by showing vertical structures in a society. This is especially relevant to research into complex and multi-faceted public opinion, as demographic characteristics often inadequately explain actual behaviour. Behaviour is defined instead by attitudes, lifestyles and value systems. With this segmentation, the natural heterogeneity inside a society can be understood and classified better. On this basis, it is also possible to develop target group-specific communication.

FIGURE 7: SEGMENTATION



Source: Ipsos.

To identify the segments a **mixture of various statistical methods** was used. In this respect, several statistical procedures were combined in a way that ensured not only that the final segments meet statistical criteria, but also that theoretical considerations would be established. The segmentation took place in **two stages**. Initially core variables were defined on the basis of theoretical assumptions. In the first stage, these were used to classify the respondents. Additionally, at a second stage, other variables were taken into account and used

³ See Rössel, Jörg (2005): Plurale Sozialstrukturanalyse. Eine handlungstheoretische Rekonstruktion der Grundbegriffe der Sozialstrukturanalyse. VS Verlag: Wiesbaden.

to separate the revealed segments from each other more precisely.

In this process, **during the first stage**, the following attitudes were factored in for the creation of the segments:

- Perception of German identity
- Perception of the migration flow
- Attitude about the willingness of the immigrants to integrate, as well as their role in relation to the employment market and welfare state
- Attitudes to refugees as well as their long-term perspectives
- Feeling of obligation towards refugees
- Satisfaction with the actions of the federal government

At a second stage, the following aspects were also considered:

- Outlook for personal and economic development
- Social trust
- Identity
- Attitude towards Islam

Our analysis yielded **five segments** that move between the dimensions of openness and protectionism. Supporters of immigration are reflected in the first segment. Two other segments exhibit mixed attitudes and differentiate between the economic and cultural aspects of immigration. However, two segments express a rejection of immigration.


Two qualitative focus groups concluded the study. This took place with participants who could be assigned to both of the middle segments and who exhibited both positive and negative attitudes towards immigration. The focus was on the goal of researching and sounding out complex and somewhat contradictory attitudes more precisely and determining how deeply rooted they were within personal value systems.

We begin below with a brief presentation of the individual groups. Then the segments will be analysed in detail. The initial analysis focuses on social status and political orientation, which reveals significant differences between the segments. A detailed presentation then follows of their different attitudes towards immigration, Muslims and integration into German society. The commitment of the segments to refugee aid is also examined, as well as their feeling of responsibility towards refugees. In all areas, major differences are apparent between the population groups. They also differ in their perceptions and assessment of German politics. Finally, various messages about immigration are evaluated with respect to their persuasiveness and credibility.

3. Overview of the Segments

The analysis yielded a division of the German population into **five segments**, which reflect the polarisation of German society on the refugee question. The groups can be classified between the extreme values of **an open and a closed idea of society** (see Figure 8). One segment includes strong supporters, while two other segments are marked by mixed attitudes and are differentiated between the economic and cultural aspects of immigration. Two other groups reveal a rejection of immigration, but differ significantly in their intensity.

FIGURE 8: OVERVIEW OF THE SEGMENTS



Data: In per cent.

Basis: n=2,002 persons polled, including 347 Radical Opponents, 363 Moderate Opponents, 462 Humanitarian Sceptics, 395 Economic Pragmatists and 435 Liberal Cosmopolitans.

Source: Segmentation on the basis of an Ipsos poll commissioned by Ipsos.

3.1. Liberal Cosmopolitans (22 per cent)

Liberal Cosmopolitans show pervasively positive attitudes towards immigration and refugees. In their view, immigrants are generally making an effort to integrate and, furthermore, they are convinced that most refugees will also integrate successfully into their new society. In their view, even when the situation in their country of origin stabilises, refugees should be offered a long-term permit to remain in Germany.

People from this segment do not believe that refugees get welfare benefits they have not earned or that they are given preference over the local population. Generally, they feel a sense of obligation to people who are fleeing from war or expulsion. In their view, the European countries have a shared responsibility for the wars in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan and should therefore make a contribution to welcoming refugees. Furthermore, they see Germany as having a special obligation due to its history and culture, as well as its positive economic development. In their view, the German government should further expand and intensify its refugee aid activities.

In relation to economics, Liberal Cosmopolitans are convinced that immigrants do work that needs to be done, which Germans are reluctant to do, and that they work harder for less pay. In this regard, they call for refugees' professional qualifications to be recognised. They themselves have recently experienced an improvement in their own situation and have a positive outlook on the coming months – not only for themselves and their families, but also for the overall situation in Germany.

In respect of culture, they are convinced of the positive effects of immigration: In their opinion, the arrival of refugees will make Germany more open to new ideas and cultures. Refugees should also be encouraged to continue to maintain their own traditions. They also have positive attitudes towards Islam: They are convinced of the peaceful character of Islam and believe that they share similar values to most Muslims. The construction of a mosque in their neighbourhood would not bother them. Thus, Liberal Cosmopolitans favour a multicultural society.

They are very likely to live in large cities such as Berlin and Hamburg and are in regular contact with people of immigrant origin. They have high levels of education and identify strongly with Alliance 90/The Greens or the SPD. Many of them have actively helped refugees in the recent past.

Liberal Cosmopolitans exhibit attitudes that could be described as open to the world and idealistic. They identify with parties that are positive about immigration and give expression to their attitudes through personal commitment.

3.2. Economic Pragmatists (20 per cent)

Economic Pragmatists are also convinced of the basic willingness of the immigrants to integrate. An optimistic perspective on the economic effects of immigration distinguishes them from other segments. Immigrants are seen as people with special capabilities that are urgently needed on the employment market. Immigrants are also viewed as workers who are willing to work for less pay than local employees. In this respect, Economic Pragmatists are convinced that immigrants with higher qualifications should be given preference.

Their economic outlook is positive – not only for themselves personally, but also for their families. However, they see no special obligation towards refugees arising from the country's good economic situation. Just a few believe that refugees should be allowed to remain in Germany if the situation in their home countries stabilises. In their opinion, the German federal government is doing enough to help refugees.

Culturally, the Economic Pragmatists are proud of their German origins and believe that Germany should do more to protect itself from the world. Refugees who come to Germany should not be encouraged to maintain their own traditions. They view Islam critically.

People from this segment have a high likelihood of living in cities, have an average level of education and are relatively financially secure. In terms of party politics, they feel close to the Union or SPD.

Economic Pragmatists ultimately have a positive attitude towards refugees, as they are convinced that the German employment market needs them. They have a conservative and national-liberal orientation and are proud of the values and virtues of German post-war society. They identify with the large mass parties (Union, SPD) and call for cultural adjustment from refugees.

3.3. Humanitarian Sceptics (23 per cent)

On many questions, Humanitarian Sceptics hold a split view of immigration and refugees. They waver between moral obligation, which makes acceptance of refugees obligatory due to Germany's historical and cultural background, and their scepticism about the success of integration. First of all, they do not believe in the successful integration of most refugees into German society. Second, they think that refugees create an increased risk of terror and do not consider closing the borders a solution.

They rate the effects of immigration on Germany, its culture and economy as neither positive nor negative. At the same time, a majority of them are satisfied with the current performance of the federal governments and think the government is doing enough to help refugees.

They are unsure of whether immigrants have special capabilities that are hard to find on the German employment market. However, they are convinced that immigrants work harder for less pay and do important jobs that Germans are reluctant to. In respect to culture, they are not convinced that immigrants should be encouraged to maintain their own traditions. Humanitarian Sceptics are explicitly against immigrants maintaining their own traditions. In relation to Islam, they have neither a clear negative nor positive position.

They are very likely to have a high level of education and are in a relatively good financial position. Humanitarian Sceptics, in particular, are characterised by not having a defined position on many immigration questions and not having a clear political-ideological home.

3.4. Moderate Opponents (18 per cent)

Moderate Opponents express a rejection of immigration. They see refugees as a major security risk and are convinced that most are not actually refugees, but are coming to Europe purely for economic reasons.

These people are convinced that globalisation is having negative consequences for Germany and expect their personal and family circumstances to deteriorate in the next twelve months. They are very likely to have a medium level of education, but a relatively low household income. A majority of them cannot identify with

any political party; however, others say they feel close to the CDU and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).

People in this segment do not think that refugees should maintain their own traditions and they predict that German identity will disappear. They harbour negative attitudes towards Muslims and Islam.

In relation to the employment market, however, Moderate Opponents can imagine accepting refugees under specific conditions. Many of them think that refugees with higher levels of education and qualifications should be given preference. A majority of them believe that immigrants are often ready to work harder for less pay than local employees. They appear significantly undecided about whether immigrants' educational qualifications should be recognised.

As a whole, Moderate Opponents express attitudes towards immigration that are negative in many respects. But even when they are critical of immigration, they see a certain positive effect and can imagine preferring immigrants who fulfil specific conditions. This relates particularly to the employment market, where they express clear support for prioritising immigrants with high qualifications.

3.5. Radical Opponents (17 per cent)

Radical Opponents do not believe that most immigrants are ready to integrate. They are convinced that refugees represent a security risk and that most people who enter the country as refugees have economic motives. Many of them support a closure of the borders. They believe Germany has suffered negative consequences due to globalisation.

They have a high probability of being between 40 and 60 and having a low or medium level of education and a low household income. They live in small cities, particularly in eastern Germany, and show a marked party identification with Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). In the recent past, they have experienced deterioration in their personal and family circumstances. They are not optimistic about their own personal future and find it increasingly difficult to be successful in Germany.

In addition, Radical Opponents feel that immigrants receive welfare benefits without giving anything back and think they are given priority over the local population. They also think refugees have no special abilities that are particularly needed in the German employment market. In this respect, they differ significantly from the Moderate Opponents, as they also do not support acceptance of refugees under certain conditions. They are also of the opinion that the German government should reduce its refugee assistance activities.

In respect to culture, they fear a gradual disappearance of German identity and reject the idea of refugees maintaining their own traditions. They have very negative attitudes towards Islam and reject it much more strongly than Moderate Opponents.

Radical Opponents thus have a very clear and firm position against everything that they perceive as an external influence. They not only reject further immigration, but also other external influences, such as economic globalisation trends. As a whole, Radical Opponents are similar to Moderate Opponents in many respects, but their views are significantly more radical and held more firmly.


Radical and Moderate Opponents differ substantially in their intensity. They share critical views of Islam and are pessimistic about the economic future. However Moderate Opponents can imagine giving preference to immigrants with higher qualifications and are convinced that immigrants work hard and for less pay than locals. By contrast, for Radical Opponents, immigration is an absolute priority and is considered negatively without exception.

3.6. Interim Conclusion

As a whole, then, our analysis yielded **five polarising segments**, differing significantly from one another in their attitudes. Liberal Cosmopolitans position themselves as especially progressive. They could be described to the world as open, idealistic and engaged. Economic Pragmatists also come across as positive, faced with

the value of immigration for the German employment market and the German economy. But at the same time, they demand that immigrants and refugees make cultural adjustments. Humanitarian Sceptics are characterised by a sense of inner conflict, as they waver between a sense of moral obligation and their scepticism about the successful integration of immigrants. Radical and Moderate Opponents are particularly opposed to immigration and other negative influences, differing from one another in the intensity of their rejection.

FIGURE 9: REPRESENTATION OF THE SEGMENTS ON THE CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSION



Representation: Own calculation.
 Basis: n=2,002 respondents.
 Source: Segmentation on the basis of poll commissioned by More in Common

Localising the segments on the cultural and economic dimensions, once again makes clear their different positions (see Figure 9). Four variables are included in the calculation: The cultural dimension was recorded via a general query about what effects immigration has on cultural life in Germany, as well as their attitude towards the refugees' own traditions. The economic perspective covered the effect of immigration on the German economy as well as the question about the refugees' special skills. In this regard, it is apparent that Economic Pragmatists and Liberal Cosmopolitans are both culturally cosmopolitan and economically liberal in their attitudes. In respect to culture, Liberal Cosmopolitans are significantly more open towards immigration than Economic Pragmatists. Humanitarian Sceptics are close to the average both on the cultural and economic dimension. By contrast, both Opponent segments exhibit economically protectionist as well as culturally nationalist attitudes.

In the following sections the segments will be analysed more precisely and presented in detail in reference to their socio-economic status, attitudes and values, feeling of obligation and commitment to helping.

4. Socio-Economic Positions and Subjective Assessment

This section examines the socio-economic situation of the segments as well as their subjective assessment of their own and the social and economic situation will be analysed first. The following section includes explanations of:

- Demographic structure of the segments, as well as
- Personal and economic prospects.


4.1. Demographic Structure of the Segments

The **male-to-female ratio** in the five segments is relatively well balanced. The overall **average age** of respondents is 45 years, just below the average population age of 47. More than half (57 per cent) of respondents in the Radical Opponents' segment are between 40 and 60 years old. In the other segments, there is a relatively even distribution across the age groups.

Proportionally, Radical Opponents are more likely to live in rural areas. The residential locations of the Moderate Opponents and Humanitarian Sceptics have a similar distribution: 17 and 18 per cent respectively of respondents live in rural areas, a majority of these people live in towns or suburbs (44 and 41 per cent). An almost equally high percentage lives in densely populated regions. By contrast, the majority of Economic Pragmatists and Liberal Cosmopolitans live in densely populated areas.

FIGURE 10: EAST-WEST DISTRIBUTION BY SEGMENT

Question: What federal state do you live in?



Representation in per cent.

Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

Radical Opponents have a greater likelihood than other segments of living in Eastern Germany (29 per cent). East Germans are also slightly over-represented among the Economic Pragmatists at 22 per cent. By contrast, Humanitarian Sceptics and Liberal Cosmopolitans have a greater likelihood of being residents of western Germany (see Figure 10).

There are even clearer differences in **socio-economic status**: At almost 70 per cent, Radical Opponents have the highest employment rate and the highest share of full-time and part-time employment. However Radical Opponents also have the lowest incomes. The poverty line in Germany is defined as EUR 1,793 per month, which corresponds to 60 per cent of the average household income. The income of 36 per cent of the Radical Opponents is below this threshold value. Thus, despite their high employment rate, more than one third of the Radical Opponents have a household income that is below the poverty threshold. In addition, compared

to other segments, Radical Opponents have the lowest levels of formal education.

At 65 per cent, Moderate Opponents have a slightly lower employment rate than Radical Opponents. However, there are clear parallels in respect to their monthly net income: 34 per cent of respondents earn less than EUR 1,750 per month, 56 per cent fewer than EUR 4,000 and one in ten more than EUR 4,000. However, their levels of formal education are significantly higher than those of the Radical Opponents.

At 62 per cent, Humanitarian Sceptics have the lowest level of employment, comparatively speaking, and, at 39 per cent, the lowest proportion of full-time employees. This reflects their old age range, with many in retirement. However, alongside the Economic Pragmatists, they have the highest average household income available: Around 30 per cent of respondents lie below the defined poverty line. In each case, 55 per cent of households earn between EUR 1,751 and EUR 4,000 per month and 14 or 15 per cent have more than EUR 4,001 per month. More than half of those polled (52 per cent) also indicate having a high level of education. In this segment 42 per cent have a medium level of education and 6 per cent have a low level of education.

At 63 per cent, Economic Pragmatists have a similar employment rate as Humanitarian Sceptics and along with them, have the highest average household income. While around 30 per cent are below the poverty line, more than half (55 per cent) of households earn between EUR 1,751 and EUR 4,000 per month and 15 per cent have more than EUR 4,001 per month. Their formal educational qualifications are similar to those of the Moderate Opponents: A majority have a medium level of education.

At 68 per cent, Liberal Cosmopolitans have the highest employment rate alongside Radical Opponents. At the same time, students are most strongly represented among them, comparatively speaking (9 per cent). They have a medium position in household incomes. One third has a monthly income below EUR 1,750. A further 51 per cent have a household income of between EUR 1,751 and EUR 4,000 per month and 16 per cent have more than EUR 4,000 per month. Liberal Cosmopolitans, by a considerable margin, are the segment with the highest level of education.


4.2. Assessment of their personal and economic prospects

When asked about their subjective outlook on their personal and economic development, around two thirds of all respondents said there had been no change in the previous year in their **overall personal or family situation**. One in five even experienced an improvement in their own situation; slightly fewer (16 per cent) perceived deterioration. Their outlook on the next five years is somewhat more positive (see Figure 11): While 46 per cent assumes no change in their own situation overall, 29 per cent of all of respondents expect a noticeable improvement. Only 17 per cent expect a negative change. In respect of changes in their overall family situation, the predominant expectation is that nothing will change in the next few years.

Despite this optimistic assessment, people in Germany are significantly more sceptical when it comes to the **country's economic development** over the next twelve months. Deterioration in the economic situation is expected by 37 per cent and only 7 per cent expect an improvement. This contradicts not only their own experiences but also the various economic forecasts, which predict that Germany should experience growth in the next few years. This illustrates the special importance of subjective perceptions, which in turn have a major influence on people's opinions and attitudes. In particular, perceptions of the volatility of the global economy and the fact that even Germany cannot pull itself out of global crises, apparently leads people to fear for the stability of the German economy.

FIGURE 11: EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Question: Thinking about the next five years, do you expect things to be better, about the same, or worse for...?



Representation in per cent.
Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

■ For You Personally ▨ For Your Family

Here, in thinking about expectations in the future, there is a significant difference between the Opponent segments and the other groups, which relates to the evaluation of their personal situation (see Table 1) as well as the expectation of the future economic development of the country: Radical Opponents, in particular, have had to endure a deterioration in the previous year (27 per cent) and thus are significantly distinct from other groups. A relatively large proportion of Moderate Opponents have also suffered deterioration in their overall situation. The clearest improvement is among Liberal Cosmopolitans, among whom one in four have experienced an improvement in their situation. Economic Pragmatists have also experienced a relatively positive change (24 per cent). A similar picture appears for the economic situation inside the family. Here, too, Radical Opponents have noticed deterioration significantly more frequently (24 per cent), while a large proportion of Economic Pragmatists and Liberal Cosmopolitans report an improvement in the overall situation inside their family.

⁴ Tagesschau (December 2016): The predictions of economic forecasters, available at: <http://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/konjunkturprognose114.html>, accessed on 9 December 2016.

TABLE 1: EVALUATION OF ONE'S OWN AND FAMILY SITUATION

Question: Taking all things together, are things better, about the same, or worse than a year ago...?


	Liberal Cosmopolitans	Economic Pragmatists	Humanitarian Sceptics	Moderate Opponents	Radical Opponents
...for you personally?					
Better	25%	24%	20%	20%	15%
About the same	64%	61%	65%	62%	58%
Worse	11%	15%	14%	17%	27%
Don't know	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%
...for your family?					
Better	19%	20%	13%	14%	11%
About the same	67%	65%	68%	66%	60%
Worse	9%	12%	14%	14%	24%
Don't know	4%	4%	5%	5%	5%

Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

The pattern is similar for **Germany's expected economic growth** (see Figure 12). Again, Radical Opponents emerge as the greatest sceptics, as 65 per cent of them assume there will be deterioration in the next few months. Moderate Opponents also have negative attitudes, but they less so than Radical Opponents: 44 per cent of them assume there will be a deterioration, but this is significantly less than among Radical Opponents. More than half of the Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists expect stability. Most Liberal Cosmopolitans expect the economic situation to remain unchanged in the next year (63 per cent). However, this segment also contains the largest share of optimists, at 15 per cent.

FIGURE 12: ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

Question: Do you think that the general economic situation of the country will improve, stay the same or get worse over the next 12 months?



Representation in per cent.
Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

It is also noteworthy that only 20 per cent of the participants in the study think they will personally benefit from the economic upturn. In all segments the majority expect **not to profit from Germany's economic growth**. This impression is especially clear among Radical Opponents: 63 per cent of them do not believe that economic growth has had a positive effect on their life. This is around 45 per cent among Moderate Opponents, Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists. Even among Liberal Cosmopolitans (35 per cent), a large number do not think that they will personally benefit from the upturn. Of all segments, Economic Pragmatists and Liberal Cosmopolitans see themselves as the most likely beneficiaries of an economic upswing.

In addition, only a few of those polled think that their immediate neighbourhood receives a **fair share of Germany's economic success** (28 per cent). Again, Radical Opponents distinguish themselves through their mainly negative assessment: Roughly one in every two people is convinced that their immediate neighbourhood does not receive a fair share of Germany's economic growth. In this way they differentiate themselves significantly from other segments. But even among Humanitarian Sceptics, Economic Pragmatists and Liberal Cosmopolitans, there remains around one quarter who feels the same. However, here the liberals also define the positive opinion: 40 per cent of them perceive a positive influence in their neighbourhood.

This fits with the assessment that it is **increasingly difficult to be successful in Germany**. 39 per cent of all respondents agree with this statement and only 29 per cent reject this statement completely. The clearest agreement with this statement comes from Radical Opponents. 68 per cent of them are convinced that people like them find it increasingly difficult to be successful in Germany. In the other segments, agreement is only between 34 per cent (Economic Pragmatists) and 31 per cent (Liberal Cosmopolitans).

4.3. Interim Conclusion

Taken as a whole, the study shows that the majority of people in Germany have experienced no significant change in their own or their family's overall situation in the previous year. Germans also hold an optimistic view of the future.

However, this doesn't apply to all segments. The Opponent segments in particular have experienced a deterioration in their overall situation in recent months and accordingly have a pessimistic view of the future. They do not believe that they are personally benefiting from economic growth and do not believe that their neighbourhood is receiving a fair share of economic success. Furthermore, they are finding it increasingly difficult to be successful in Germany. This matches their socio-economic status, which exhibits high employment rates but low levels of formal education and low household income. Economic Pragmatists and Liberal Cosmopolitans have enjoyed a relatively positive personal and family life history and are optimistic for the future. They have a high socio-economic status and do not feel it is increasingly difficult to be successful in Germany. But at the same time, a high proportion of Economic Pragmatists believe that they are not personally profiting from economic growth. Humanitarian Sceptics can be classified between both of these extremes.

XENOPHOBIA, GLOBALISATION'S LOSERS AND THE SUCCESS OF RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES

One of the most important explanations for the success of right-wing populist parties is the presence of xenophobic attitudes. Voters with negative attitudes towards immigrants have an increased likelihood of voting for right-wing populist parties. Immigrants can be perceived as an economic threat, because people are afraid of losing their jobs to the new competition, or fear the welfare state will be overloaded due to higher outgoings. A perceived cultural threat also plays a role when it is feared that increased cultural diversity causes one's own culture to be lost. In the context of increased immigration from Muslim countries, there are anxieties about the potential threat to the secular state and liberal values. Right-wing populist parties frequently place traditional left-wing themes, such as gender equality, on their agenda in order to mobilise support against immigration.

Fear of immigration represents a more general fear of globalisation, one especially found among those who are called globalisation's losers. These are the people who derive little or no benefit from open national

borders, in contrast to globalisation's winners, who have had new international work opportunities opened up to them and who appreciate a culturally diverse environment. Most of this group consists of young people with high levels of education and income. Correspondingly, these factors reduce the probability of voting for a right-wing populist party.

5. Political Orientation

If the individual segments are considered with respect to their party preferences (see Figure 13), it is clear that the **Radical Opponents** segment feels most strongly represented by the AfD (29 per cent). The CDU gets the second highest approval with 11 per cent, followed by the SPD (9 per cent), the Left (7 per cent) and the FDP (3 per cent). The lowest preference of this segment is for Alliance 90/The Greens and a further 35 per cent could not give a party affiliation.

FIGURE 13: PARTY PREFERENCE BY SEGMENT

Question: Generally speaking, are you inclined towards a specific party?



Representation in per cent

Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

The **Moderate Opponents** have the strongest preference for the CDU (17 per cent), and the second strongest for the AfD (15 per cent). The SPD receives 8 per cent approval, the Left 5 per cent and Alliance 90/The Greens, 4 per cent. The largest group, 44 per cent, could not identify with any party. It is interesting that despite similar attitudinal patterns in the Radical Opponent and Moderate Opponent segments, they show significant differences in party preference. These are clear in relation to the CDU (11 compared to 17 per cent), the AfD (29 compared to 15 per cent) and Alliance 90/The Greens (1 compared to 4 per cent).

The **Humanitarian Sceptics** segment feels most strongly connected to the CDU (19 per cent), and their second preference is the SPD at 16 per cent. The Left receive the third strongest support (10 per cent), followed by Alliance 90/The Greens (9 per cent) and only 4 per cent can identify with the FDP and the AfD. 36 per cent indicate no party preference. In accordance with the various attitudinal patterns, Humanitarian Sceptics differ significantly in their party preferences from the Opponent segments. Due to their differentiated perspective on immigration, they sympathise more strongly with the politics of the CDU and SPD. These differences are also

apparent in their preferences for Alliance 90/The Greens and the Left. The most serious differences between Humanitarian Sceptics and the Opponent segments are apparent in their attitude towards the AfD. Although radical and Moderate Opponents prefer the AfD by 29 and 15 per cent respectively, it enjoys only 4 per cent approval from the Humanitarian Sceptics.


The **Economic Pragmatists** most strongly identify with the CDU (22 per cent) and the SPD (18 per cent). Alliance 90/The Greens receive the third-highest approval, following by the AfD (8 per cent) and the Left (7 per cent). At 3 per cent, the FDP has the lowest support. In this segment, 31 per cent of respondents have no party affiliation. If the preferences of this group are compared to other segments, significant differences are apparent in the preference for the CDU compared to the Radical Opponents. Further differences are apparent in the vote for the SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens. The Economic Pragmatists incline to these parties more often than the Opponent segments do. Compared to the Opponent and Humanitarian Sceptic segments, the AfD receives significantly lower identification values. However, it is preferred more often than by the Liberal Cosmopolitans.

The highest approval values of the **Liberal Cosmopolitans** are for Alliance 90/The Greens (22 per cent) and the SPD (20 per cent). The second-highest preference is for the CDU and the Left with 16 per cent each. After that comes the FDP (4 per cent) and the AfD (2 per cent). Only 17 per cent of this segment feels no party affiliation. The Liberal Cosmopolitans show the highest approval values in its preference for Alliance 90/The Greens and the Left – significantly so compared to all other segments. Their values and attitudes reflect the politics of these parties. Conversely, they have the lowest approval for the AfD.

As well as party affiliation, the **Left-Right-Self-classification** of those polled was collected. In this the political alignment of respondents on a 7-point scale, in which "1" signified fully left, "4" is the centre and "7" fully right. The majority of all respondents selected the political centre (56 per cent), 29 per cent placed themselves left of centre and 15 per cent right of centre. Only a minority chose extreme values.

FIGURE 14: LEFT-RIGHT SELF-CLASSIFICATION

Question: Where would you place yourself on a Left-Right scale from 1 to 7 when 1 stands for "totally left" and 7 for "totally right"?



Representation in per cent.
 Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
 Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

The majority of **Radical Opponents** place themselves in the centre (57 per cent), but a higher proportion place themselves to the right of the political centre than in any other segment (29 per cent place themselves: see Figure 14). Three per cent of them select the extreme value. This is also reflected in the average, which, at 4.19, comparatively speaking, is the furthest to the right. Of all segments, **Moderate Opponents** see themselves most strongly connected to the centre (64 per cent), 13 per cent are in the left-wing camp and 23 per cent place themselves to the right of centre on the scale. They are relatively close to the political self-classification of the Radical Opponents and have a similar average value of 4.11. 31 per cent of the **Humanitarian Sceptics'** segment places itself on the left side of the scale and 7 per cent on the right side. Compared to both Opponent segments, they identify more sharply with the left of the political spectrum. 61 per cent consider themselves a centrist, which is also reflected in their average of 3.69. **Economic Pragmatists** are relatively similar, 59 per cent identifying with the political centre. 27 consider themselves to be left of centre on the scale, 14 per cent on the right. With an average of 3.79 they are somewhat more right wing than Humanitarian Sceptics. By contrast, a majority of **Liberal Cosmopolitans** (55 per cent) place themselves on the left side of the spectrum, 42 per cent in the centre and only 4 per cent choose points on the scale to the right of centre. Their average of 3.24 shows a clear left-wing orientation.

Our data shows **major differences in the political orientation** of the segments: Radical Opponents show a clear preference for the AfD. Although a high proportion of Moderate Opponents also share this opinion, a slightly higher number identify with the Union and many do not identify with any political party. By contrast, Humanitarian Sceptics appear to have no clear political home. They identify with the Union, the SPD and the Left and have a relatively high number of people who don't identify with a particular party. Economic Pragmatists have a clear preference for the popular SPD and Union parties, while Liberal Cosmopolitans identify mainly with the SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens. In addition, a look at the political orientation reveals **discrepancies** between the Left-Right self-classification and party identification. Almost all segments see themselves as being politically in the centre, although the political positions of the parties they identify with differ from one another fundamentally. Surprisingly, even among people who feel they are socially in the centre, a majority feel represented by the AfD. This, in turn, fits the self-understanding of the AfD, which regularly defends itself against classification as a right-wing populist party.

THE AfD AND THE INTEGRATION-EXCLUSION CONFLICT LINE

The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) [Alternative for Germany] emerged in 2013 as a reaction to the Euro rescue package, which served to secure financial stability in the Euro currency area. In its early years criticism of the Euro emerged as the main theme of the party, which, among other things, promotes the reintroduction of national currencies and the creation of small currency unions, striving to present itself as a serious centre-right movement. Within a short time it managed to build up regional associations in all federal states and had more than 14,000 members by the end of 2013. The AfD is now represented in nine of sixteen federal state parliaments. These include: Baden-Württemberg, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia.

The AfD party programme emphasises German identity, considers multiculturalism a threat to social cohesion and distances itself from Islam, which, in its view, is not part of Germany. It also rejects the idea of Germany as a country of immigration and calls for a complete closure of the EU's external borders. Integration is seen as a duty of the immigrants, who must adapt to their new home. In this it shows major overlaps with the PEGIDA movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West), which attracted attention in recent years with its Monday demonstrations, especially in eastern Germany. It is also now classified as a right-wing populist party by media and party researchers – an image that the party publicly rejects. The AfD and its party programme have enjoyed particularly strong support in eastern Germany, which is also reflected in our data.

Until recently there were no significant right-wing populist forces in Germany. This situation, which was exceptional for Western Europe, was explained, first of all, by the fact that the established right-wing parties CDU/CSU

⁵ Federal political education centre: Party profile – Alternative für Deutschland, at: <https://www.bpb.de/politik/wahlen/wer-steht-zur-wahl/bundestag-2013/165526/afd>, accessed on 08 December 2016.

already positioned themselves strongly to the right and thus left no room for new parties. Secondly, the association of right-wing populism with Germany's National Socialist past makes it difficult for parties of this kind to find acceptance in German society. The success of Alternative für Deutschland and its entry into, as of now, nine state parliaments make it clear that a normalisation process is underway in Germany.

Whether the AfD can establish itself in Germany over the long term remains to be seen. Generally, however, the success of right-wing populist parties in Europe is not a short-term phenomenon. Rather, a long-term restructuring of the political space is observable in Western Europe. Globalisation has eroded the significance of national borders. In reaction to this development, an Integration-Exclusion conflict line has formed in western European countries. Parties standing for more or less openness position themselves along this conflict line. In this, right-wing populists play a decisive role, as they are often the only political force that positions itself strongly against two central aspects, among others, of this conflict line, namely European integration and immigration. These are also the two central themes of the AfD.

6. Attitudes towards Immigration and Its Effects

The following section analyses the attitudes of people in Germany towards migration. The following aspects were studied:

- The perception of the migration flow
- The perception of immigrants and refugees
- Immigration and its effects
- Immigration and the employment market
- Immigration and the welfare state

6.1. Perception of the Migration Flow

Germans have mixed views of their country's refugee intake. On the one hand, the humanity Germany has displayed in this period is praised. In an emergency situation, action was taken, instead of only being discussed. Among those polled, this sentiment is strongest in the Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatist segments. At the same time, the event symbolises the crisis Europe is currently going through. Many of those polled indicate that they feel they have been left in the lurch by other European states, as the following quotes from our focus groups show:

*"The first time I felt happy that Merkel ran out in front a bit and said we will help."
(Humanitarian Sceptic)*

"We were left alone in Europe. It wasn't planned that we would accept so many. There hasn't been any redistribution, as the people up top probably thought there would be." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

"In the beginning I had more understanding, especially for the war refugees, perhaps because my parents were war refugees. When the others then tried to get in too, I didn't find it so thrilling." (Economic pragmatist)


In the quantitative polling, almost 80 per cent of those polled indicate that in the last five years the proportion of immigrants in Germany has increased (see Figure 15). This is felt most by Radical Opponents (89 per cent, strongly/somewhat increased). But also people in other segments, especially Moderate Opponents and

⁶ Alternative für Deutschland: Short version of manifesto, available at: https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/07/2016-06-20_afd-kurzfassung_grundsatzprogramm_webversion.pdf, accessed on 08 December 2016.


Humanitarian Sceptics, indicate by more than 80 per cent that the number of immigrants has increased. A slightly smaller proportion of Liberal Cosmopolitans (77 per cent) are of this opinion. However, it is noteworthy that a relatively low number of respondents have noticed an increase in the number of immigrants in their immediate neighbourhood. Only slightly over half of the respondents are of this opinion. Again it is the Opponent segments that report the sharpest increase.

FIGURE 15: GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS

Question: Over the last five years, the number of immigrants living in Germany has...



Question: Over the last five years, the number of immigrants living in your local area has...




Representation in per cent.
 Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
 Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

In this there are significant differences between residents of major cities and residents of rural areas (see Figure 16): People in large cities have noted (56 per cent) an increase in immigrants in their immediate neighbourhood more often than people in rural areas (49 per cent).

FIGURE 16: INCREASED NEIGHBOURHOOD IMMIGRATION

Question: Over the last five years, has the number of immigrants living in your local area increased?



6.2. Perception of Immigrants and Refugees


In order to study the extent to which those questioned in Germany differentiate between immigrants and refugees, they were presented with various word pairs. Based on these word pairs, they ordered their perceptions of refugees and immigrants in each case on a scale of 1 to 5.⁷

"Different to me" versus "Similar to me": Immigrants are perceived differently than refugees. 68 per cent indicate that refugees are "completely different". However, according to the answers of those questioned this applies to only 53 per cent of immigrants (see Figure 17). The Opponents see the biggest differences between refugees and themselves. 86 or 84 per cent indicate that refugees are "completely different". The Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists also see major differences between refugees or immigrants and themselves. Liberal Cosmopolitans are distinct from the other segments in their perception of refugees and immigrants. 38 per cent indicate that refugees are "completely different". At the same time 32 per cent think that refugees are "like" themselves. Immigrants are rated "completely different" by 29 per cent, but 34 per cent indicate they are "similar". Liberal Cosmopolitans show that they feel a much greater closeness to immigrants and refugees.

⁷ The results in the following section are each indicated as the Top 2 and Bottom 2 boxes.

FIGURE 17: WORD PAIR "THEY ARE DIFFERENT TO ME" AND "SIMILAR TO ME"

Question: Below you will see some pairs of words. For each pair, please move the slider to show where you would place the following group:



Representation in per cent.


Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

"Violent" versus "peaceful": 30 per cent of all of those polled indicate that refugees are "violent" and 36 per cent judge them to be "peaceful". In comparison, 40 per cent perceive immigrants as "peaceful" (see Figure 18). A majority of Radical Opponents espouse the view that refugees are "violent" (66 per cent). Radical Opponents also often place immigrants on the dimension "violent" (41 per cent). A majority of the Moderate Opponents, Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists assess both refugees and immigrants neutrally. Liberal Cosmopolitans judge refugees and immigrants to be "peaceful", only a few describe refugees and immigrants as "violent".

FIGURE 18: WORD PAIR "VIOLENT" AND "PEACEFUL"

Question: Below you will see some pairs of words. For each pair, please move the slider to show where you would place the following group:




Representation in per cent.
 Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
 Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

"Good" versus "Bad": Those questioned find it difficult to classify refugees and immigrants on the dimensions "good" versus "bad" (see Figure 19). This overall impression is confirmed across all segments: Except for the Liberal Cosmopolitans, the majority of each adopts a neutral position.

FIGURE 19: WORD PAIR "GOOD" AND "BAD"

Question: Below you will see some pairs of words. For each pair, please move the slider to show where you would place the following group:



Representation in per cent.
 Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
 Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

It is clear, overall, that the terms immigrant and refugee trigger different associations among those questioned. Across all three word pairs, refugees are more strongly associated with negative characteristics than immigrants. This is especially clear on the attribute "similar" and "different", in which respondents feel a much greater distance from refugees than immigrants. The characteristic "violent" is chosen much more often for refugees than for immigrants. It is only on the attributes "good" and "bad" that the differences between refugees and immigrants are less marked, as a majority of those questioned select the neutral category.

6.3. Immigration and its Effects

The participants in our study were undecided when asked about the general **effects of immigration** on German society. Only 31 per cent believe in positive consequences. Opposed to them are 28 per cent who think that immigration has previously had negative effects. By contrast, the majority of respondents (40 per cent) are undecided.

Liberal Cosmopolitans are the only segment in which most members believe that immigration has had a positive influence (69 per cent). Economic Pragmatists also tend to emphasise the positive influence of immigration (46 per cent). Humanitarian Sceptics are the most likely to be undecided (58 per cent), while a majority of the Opponent segments see immigration as problematic. Surprisingly, the age of those polled appears to have an influence: Those people between 60 and 70 evaluate the effects of immigration on

Germany significantly more positively than other age groups.

46 per cent of those polled are of the opinion that immigration is **currently good for the German economy**, and around one fifth do not agree with this opinion. But the question is polarising: It is especially for Economic Pragmatists and Liberal Cosmopolitans, who perceive that migration is having a positive, dynamic influence on the German economy. Only 10 per cent of Radical Opponents and 9 per cent of Moderate Opponents, share the positive assessment of immigration. Again the age of respondents plays a central role, with middle-aged people (40 to 60) in particular evaluating the effect of immigration on the German economy significantly more often as negative.

The statement that immigration is currently **good for cultural life** is similarly polarising (see Table 2). On the one hand, 65 per cent of Radical Opponents disagree with this statement; on the other, only one per cent of Liberal Cosmopolitans do so. Almost 90 per cent of the Liberal Cosmopolitans see immigration as having a positive impact on cultural life in Germany. Economic Pragmatists, at 70 per cent, are also substantially positive, but significantly less enthusiastic compared to Liberal Cosmopolitans. Humanitarian Sceptics, similar to their attitude towards the economic influence of migration, tend to be undecided. As well as age, which shows that young people, in particular, believe in the positive influences of migration on culture, differences between men and women are also apparent: Significantly more men (30 per cent) rate migration's influence on culture as bad.

TABLE 2: EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION ON ECONOMY AND CULTURE

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
Please select one answer for every statement.

	Liberal Cosmopolitans	Economic Pragmatists	Humanitarian Sceptics	Moderate Opponents	Radical Opponents
<i>Immigration nowadays is good for Germany's economy, bringing in new skills, new opportunities, and drive to succeed.</i>					
Strongly agree / tend to agree	89%	85%	27%	9%	9%
Neither agree nor disagree	9%	12%	49%	40%	29%
Tend to disagree / strongly disagree	2%	3%	18%	46%	61%
Don't know	1%	1%	6%	6%	1%
<i>Immigration nowadays is good for Germany's cultural life, making Germany a more vibrant and exciting place to live.</i>					
Strongly agree / tend to agree	88%	70%	20%	8%	9%
Neither agree nor disagree	11%	23%	51%	32%	25%
Tend to disagree / strongly disagree	1%	6%	24%	54%	65%
Don't know	0%	1%	6%	6%	1%

Representation in per cent.

Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.


6.4. Immigration and the Employment Market

Economic Pragmatists differ significantly from the other segments on the question of whether immigrants have **special skills** (see Figure 20). Almost three quarters of them think that immigrants often have special skills. They thus outdo even the Liberal Cosmopolitans. The Opponents reject the statement strongly.

This statement, **immigrants often work in jobs that need to be done, but Germans are reluctant to do**, provokes sharply conflicting reactions. At 75 per cent, Liberal Cosmopolitans are strongly convinced that immigrants take necessary jobs that Germans don't like to do. But Economic Pragmatists (66 per cent) also show that they are convinced about the positive effects on the employment market. 63 per cent of the Humanitarian Sceptics also share this view. Radical Opponents distance themselves from other segments, only 10 per cent of them agreeing with this statement.

FIGURE 20: IMMIGRATION AND THE EMPLOYMENT MARKET

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?.



Representation of the Top 2 boxes (strongly agree / tend to agree) in per cent. Basis: Sample size = 2,002. Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common

The data is similar for the statement **Immigrants are often ready to work harder for less pay** than German employees. Economic Pragmatists (72 per cent) and Liberal Cosmopolitans (74 per cent) most readily endorse the claim that immigrants are often willing to work for less pay. The Opponent segments are on the other side, but here the Radical Opponents differ significantly from the moderate ones. Only 12 per cent of Radical Opponents share this opinion in contrast to almost 58 per cent of Moderate Opponents.

On the question of whether **Immigrants with higher levels of education and better qualifications should be preferred**, Economic Pragmatists (58 per cent) are the most likely to share this opinion. Most Moderate Opponents (48 per cent) agree with this statement. In this regard, the Opponent segments differ significantly from one another: This statement meets with the lowest approval of all segments among the Radical Opponents, at 29 per cent.

The differences between the segments are less clear on the question of whether refugees should be allowed to work for **lower wages** than German citizens. 46 per cent of all respondents reject this suggestion, only around one fifth agree, the rest are undecided. Liberal Cosmopolitans are the only segment in which a majority thinks that lower wages should be allowed.

6.5. Immigration and the Welfare State

In the refugee debate, welfare benefits are often mentioned. Both Opponent segments have a clear position on the statement: **Immigrants receive benefits and make use of the welfare state, although they don't do anything in return**. In each case, more than 70 per cent agree with this statement. Compared with Humanitarian Sceptics, almost twice as many Economic Pragmatists, 31 per cent, are likely to reject this statement. Only Liberal Cosmopolitans have a clear positive attitude. Almost 60 per cent of them reject this statement.

In addition, in each case more than 65 per cent of the Radical and Moderate Opponents are convinced that **immigrants are given preference for special services provided by the state**. The Liberal Cosmopolitans distinguish themselves from all other segments in that they, at 59 per cent, most strongly reject the statement that immigrants are given preference in receiving welfare benefits.

This fits with the assessment of the **motives of the refugees** arriving in Germany. Many of those polled believe that refugees mainly emigrate for economic reasons. This position is especially strongly held by the Opponents, but even the Economic Pragmatists tend towards the economically motivated position. Liberal Cosmopolitans are the only group in which a majority (64 per cent) are convinced that refugees do not leave their homelands and come to Germany for economic reasons.

As the data shows, Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists do not take a clear position on whether refugees exploit the welfare state. As the qualitative study in the focus groups shows, **there is a feeling of injustice** on one side. Both Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists feel that refugees receive welfare benefits (e.g. free tickets for public transport, nursery places) that German citizens do not receive or have to fight hard for. A feeling of being disadvantaged is generated that has negative effects on the acceptance of refugees. There is a strong doubt about the motivation of refugees in relation to young male immigrants, from Africa especially. No emergency situation such as the threat from a war is seen here and for that reason there is no feeling of responsibility towards this group.

It is important to highlight, however, that respondents see **failings in the current German asylum process**, which leaves the refugees in a situation where they are dependent on welfare benefits. In the focus groups, both Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists voiced concerns that refugees' applications for asylum should be processed more quickly and they should be given official work permits so that they can integrate into the labour market. This would reduce the dependency on welfare benefits. Those polled believe that this will motivate refugees themselves to show commitment to social integration.

"The Africans will still be much worse than the Syrians. The Syrians aren't black and don't necessarily wear headscarves. In their own country most Syrians also

had houses and money. They weren't poor. But the Africans, there are lots of them, lots of young men, there's nothing like a war there, nothing to eat, no prospects. In Germany there are golden water taps." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

"The refugees get a travel card. But a poor German doesn't. That's not right. They get an unlimited travel card like that." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

"There are states that offer people this social security. That's why they all come here. And this social looting or exploitation of our welfare benefits is extremely high." (Economic Pragmatist)

"They don't have to do anything here. I think it's totally crazy that they can go a year without working." (Economic Pragmatist)

"The young people should receive training where they can learn something that makes it easier for them in their career and will allow them to make a contribution to stimulate the economy. The money being invested has to come back somehow." (Economic pragmatist)

6.6. Interim Conclusion

This chapter studied the attitudes of people in Germany towards immigrants and refugees in particular and their attitudes towards immigration in general. The Opponent segments are the most likely to describe immigrants and refugees with negative words. Liberal Cosmopolitans, by contrast, use positive associations more frequently. At the same time, it is apparent that the word "refugee" evokes more negative associations among those polled than "immigrant".

In addition, the data shows a discrepancy between the perception of change in the country and change in the immediate neighbourhood: For example, almost all of those polled have noticed an increase in immigration numbers in Germany in the last five years. But in the immediate vicinity this increase was only apparent to a relatively small extent.

Those polled are divided about the effects of immigration. A majority is convinced that there are positive effects on the German economy and culture. But the segments differ significantly from one another on this question.

On questions about the role of immigrants on the employment market, the attitudes of Economic Pragmatists, in particular, are distinctive: Economic Pragmatists see immigrants as a resource. They believe that they have important skills and work for little money in segments of the employment market where they do not compete with local employees. At the same time, they are convinced that immigrants with better professional qualifications should be given preference over other immigrants. But Economic Pragmatists, like all other segments, decisively reject the idea of them being allowed to work at lower wages than German employees. While a majority of the Humanitarian Sceptics are undecided about the effect of immigration on the employment market, Liberal Cosmopolitans are convinced of the positive consequences and the need to integrate immigrants into the German employment market.

The role immigrants play in relation to the welfare state meets with strong criticism from the Opponents: Both Radical and Moderate Opponents believe that immigrants are given preference and are beneficiaries of welfare services. A great many of them believe that the refugees emigrate for economic reasons and are not refugees at all. Humanitarian Sceptics also doubt the motives of the refugees for coming to Germany and have the feeling that refugees receive welfare benefits that are denied to German citizens.

7. Attitude towards Muslims

Anti-immigrant parties in Germany and throughout Europe have in recent years focused their public communications on perceived cultural clashes between Muslims and the values of European societies. For example, various political parties, especially leading politicians in eastern European countries, called for only accepting Christian refugees. The rejection of Muslim refugees is justified by the claim that they represent a threat to national security. Referring to individual terrorist attacks, proponents of this option warn that Islamist terrorists could infiltrate western European societies in the flows of refugees.

Apprehension about Muslim immigrants has been debated since the beginning of the increase in Muslim immigration in the late 1990s. In the context of debates about Muslim symbols such as headscarves, minarets and mosques, there is an underlying anxiety about whether Muslim immigrants share western values. For this reason, the full veil has been banned in France and Belgium. In Switzerland, a referendum led to a prohibition on constructing new minarets and many countries have experienced contentious public debate over the construction of mosques.

Some studies have shown that locals prefer Christian immigrants to Muslim immigrants although there is also strong evidence that when it comes to refugees, an overwhelming proportion of both Europeans and Americans prefer a non-discriminatory policy.⁸ Alongside the perception of Muslim immigrants as an economic or cultural danger, their religious practices and conservative attitudes are criticised, for example, in relation to the full-face veil. This suggests that it is not only people who in principle oppose immigration that have negative attitudes towards Muslims. Even liberals, who are tolerant towards minorities, criticise certain cultural and religious practices of Muslims, such as the wearing of the headscarf.


Those interviewed for this study also exhibit anxieties about Islam: For example, 31 per cent believe that Islam is a peaceful religion, 36 percent do not agree. Only one quarter think that most Muslims believe in similar values to themselves, and one in two is convinced that most Muslims in Germany would rather live under Sharia than under German law. Almost as high a proportion of those polled (47 per cent) consider Islam and German society to be mutually incompatible. In addition, 39 per cent believe that the refugees currently coming to Europe are more inclined towards extremism than German Muslims. Only one quarter of those polled would not mind if a mosque were built close to their house. Despite this critical basic attitude, a major undecidedness is revealed in German society: Between one fifth and up to one third of respondents in each case could not take a clear position on Islam, answering with "neither". An also relevant proportion of people (between 4 and 11 per cent) explicitly chose the answer option "Don't know".

There is evidence from the study to suggest that unfamiliarity with Muslims is a major factor behind these anxieties. Although the survey did not ask directly whether respondents knew any Muslims personally, questions around perceptions of Muslims showed age has significant influence on this matter. Younger Germans are far more likely to know Muslims personally, having grown up in a more diverse society. There are clear age differences on the question of the incompatibility between Islam and German society: people in the young age group of 18 to 30-year-olds are more likely to reject the idea that the two are incompatible. Young people are also the least concerned about the construction of a mosque in their neighbourhood and in this they differ significantly from other age groups. By contrast, the older age groups between 50 and 70 tend towards the opinion that they have similar values to most Muslims. All younger age groups show significantly lower agreement values here. For example, 28 per cent of 60 to 70-year-olds believe that they have similar values to Muslims, while only 21 per cent of those polled between the ages of 40 and 50 years agree.

⁸ Bansak, Kirk, Jens Hainmueller, Dominik Hangartner (2016): How economic, Humanitarian, and religious concerns shape European attitudes toward asylum seekers. *Science*. 10.1126/science.aag.2147.

FIGURE 21: ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISLAM

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about islam?



Representation of the Top 2 boxes (strongly agree / tend to agree) in per cent.
 Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
 Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

If the segments are considered separately, Liberal Cosmopolitans are the only segment that express entirely positive feelings about Muslims (see Figure 21). 78 per cent believe that Islam is a peaceful religion. Few (9 per cent) are convinced that Islam is incompatible with German society and 71 per cent think that they have similar values to most Muslims. For three-quarters of them, even the construction of a mosque in their immediate neighbourhood would not be a problem. In addition, only 14 per cent of them think that most Muslims in Germany would rather live under Sharia law and that refugees are more inclined towards extremism than German Muslims.

In contrast, Radical Opponents are characterised by an especially critical attitude towards Islam and distinguish themselves significantly from the other groups in almost all statements. For example, only 12 per

cent believe in the peaceful character of Islam. By contrast, 84 per cent are convinced of the incompatibility of Islam and German society and almost as many assume that most Muslims in Germany would rather live under Sharia than German law. In addition, 73 per cent believe that the refugees coming to Europe are more inclined towards extremism than German Muslims.

Radical Opponents and Moderate Opponents, in this respect, are similar only on two issues. Firstly, both groups reject the construction of a mosque nearby. Secondly, both also disagree with the statement that they have similar values to Muslims. Although in other questions Moderate Opponents prove to be very critical of Islam, their judgement is significantly more moderate than that of Radical Opponents.

The attitudes of Economic Pragmatists and Humanitarian Sceptics can be classified between the two extremes above. Humanitarian Sceptics have a significantly more open attitude towards Muslims than Economic Pragmatists. While 30 per cent of Humanitarian Sceptics accept the peaceful nature of Islam, only 18 per cent of Economic Pragmatists share this view. In addition, only 35 per cent of Humanitarian Sceptics believe that German society and Islam are incompatible with one another, but 56 per cent of Economic Pragmatists do. Furthermore, only 10 per cent of Economic Pragmatists are convinced that they have similar values to most Muslims, while this applies to almost twice as many (19 per cent) Humanitarian Sceptics. 64 per cent of Economic Pragmatists also think that most Muslims would rather live under Sharia law than German law, but only 34 per cent of Humanitarian Sceptics hold this belief. 43 per cent of Economic Pragmatists think that refugees are more inclined towards extremism than German Muslims. Only a quarter of Humanitarian Sceptics share this view. Finally, the rejection of mosque building in the neighbourhood is significantly more marked among Economic Pragmatists than among Humanitarian Sceptics.

However, major undecidedness is apparent, particularly for Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists. Humanitarian Sceptics are undecided about the question of whether the refugees who are coming to Europe are more strongly inclined towards extremism than German Muslims: 38 percent answer "neither". But more than one third was also not able to answer the question about the peaceful character of Islam and the compatibility of Islam with German society. The picture is similar for Economic Pragmatists, 40 per cent of whom do not take a clear position on whether Islam is a peaceful religion. As with Humanitarian Sceptics, Economic Pragmatists select the "neither" option relatively often in other questions related to Islam.

In the qualitative study of the Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists, it is clear that the current refugee debate always necessarily involves an Islam debate. Muslim's beliefs are often considered a central factor influencing integration. Many respondents believe that German society and Islam are not mutually compatible and this leads to tensions. They have the impression that Muslim refugees do not share the German value system and that they weaken it. For example, many deny that the Muslim faith acknowledges the equal rights of all people, particularly the equality of women. Examples such as the current debate about the acceptance of child marriage for refugee children or media reports about religiously motivated violence against women increase this fear. Associated with this, is the belief that Muslim refugees place their religion above the law and this leads to tensions. The feeling that German laws are not respected and accepted triggers disappointment among those polled and reduces their willingness to offer support. At the same time those polled acknowledge their own lack of knowledge about Islam (for example, in respect to the various sects and interpretations of Islam) and admit self-critically that this stirs up doubts and fears that do not apply to immigrants or refugees from predominantly Christian countries. The following quotes from the focus groups make this clear.

"But there are also still different Islams. Which type is good and which is bad. It's hard to make sense of. The problem is Islamism, the political interpretation, radical interpretation. There are also Muslims who live normal secular lives. I don't know why many daughters don't need to wear a headscarf." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

"The religious aspect will be the worst aspect of the whole thing. They will not

⁹ The background to the debate was the federal government's plan to ban religious marriages for those under 18. At the same time the basic minimum age for marriage is to be raised from 16 to 18 years. In addition, the federal government announced that, in Germany, it would annul child marriages concluded abroad, see for example: Zeit online (12 October 2016): Eheschließung erst ab 18 Jahren, available at: <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-10/kinderehe-religioese-trauung-muslime-deutschland-verbot>, accessed on 20 December 2016. And: Federal government Government press conference on 31 October, available at: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2016/10/2016-10-31-regpk.html>, accessed on 22 December 2016.

integrate here. Christianity needed hundreds of years to recognise that you can't accomplish anything with violence." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

"Islam, as it is lived, meaning not from the book, is contrary to what the West stands for. When there are people like Erdogan or other leaders, who then pitch in, you can only stir up fears or be afraid." (Economic Pragmatist)

"The refugee debate is closely interwoven with the Islam debate. It's very much about the immigration of Muslims. It's not about Christian, it's about Muslim or non-Muslim." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

The results of this study show that those polled have anxieties about Islam: In particular, the question of whether Islam is a peaceful religion reveals a split attitude among Germans. Almost one in two considers Islam and German society to be incompatible with one another. If the segments are considered separately, Radical Opponents in particular are characterised by an especially critical attitude towards Islam and distinguish themselves significantly from all other groups in almost all statements. Only Liberal Cosmopolitans are open-minded about Islam. This highlights the need for greater efforts to address the uncertainty and apprehension that many Germans feel towards Muslims, since it is at the centre of anxieties about immigration and refugees.

8. Integration of Refugees

In the wake of the immigration and refugee crisis, however, it is no longer only receiving immigrants that matters, but also integrating them. In particular, incidents such as the sexual attacks in Cologne over New Year in 2015, raised debate about the successful integration of refugees. Of course, in reality, integration relates not only to one group that has to adjust (see assimilation), but places responsibility on both groups.¹⁰

In the context of our study various topics related to the integration of immigrants and refugees were considered. They included:

- The **integration efforts** made by immigrants and refugees, meaning the question of whether immigrants and refugees make an effort to integrate and whether they will be successful in this.
- The **long-term outlook** for refugees, meaning whether they should receive permission to live permanently in Germany, and
- **Integration conditions** that must be promoted by immigrants and refugees as well as by German society.

8.1. Integration Efforts by Immigrants and Refugees

In reference to the general **efforts of immigrants to integrate into German society**, there are major differences between the segments. Economic Pragmatists and Liberal Cosmopolitans take a positive view of this. More than three quarters of those polled in these segments are convinced that immigrants want to integrate into German society. Humanitarian Sceptics are largely uncertain in their statements. 32 per cent of them believe that immigrants are making an effort, but around 19 per cent doubt this and 42 per cent are undecided. As would be expected, Radical Opponents are most likely to reject this statement. More than 60 per cent of them do not share this view and only 9 per cent accept that immigrants are making an effort to integrate into Germany.

A majority also doubt that the refugees who come to Germany will succeed into integrating into society. Only 23 per cent believe this, while almost one out of every two (46 per cent) does not agree. This question polarises the segments very sharply: Liberal Cosmopolitans are the only segment in which a majority (69 per cent) assume that refugees will successfully integrate into German society. By contrast, only 5 per cent of

¹⁰ Reichel, David (2011): Staatsbürgerschaft und Integration. Die Bedeutung der Einbürgerung für MigrantInnen, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

the Radical Opponents and 6 per cent each of the Moderate Opponents and Humanitarian Sceptics believe integration will be successful. Even the Economic Pragmatists are rather sceptical (only 21 per cent agree).

The question of the **definition of integration** was posed during the focus group discussion. What does integration mean in the perception of those polled? It is clear that, in their view, first and foremost, it is refugees themselves who are responsible for successful integration and must adapt. They must show the will to learn the German language, show a commitment to integrate into German culture and develop the ambition to succeed on the employment market. Government agencies are seen as an important intermediary in this process, having to create the required framework conditions as well as language, integration and professional education and training courses. Responsibility for the task of having to create opportunities for refugees to encounter citizens is placed upon politicians. Economic Pragmatists and Humanitarian Sceptics often exclude themselves from the integration process. Their understanding of the term integration is one-sided. Refugees need to integrate into the German cultural, legal, and value systems and interact with them respectfully. The refugees' own culture should only be expressed within their own households. Participants in the focus groups were less likely to discuss whether there is a need for an active and open-minded engagement by the German population with the culture of the refugees, is barely discussed. The following quotes illustrate this understanding of integration.

"The refugees first. The customs that are typical outside, [must be learned]."
(Humanitarian Sceptic)

"If you're a guest somewhere, you need to behave. I also find fault with the Arabs or Turks. If they're not happy here, don't like the way we live, that women are independent, why do they come to the country?" (Economic Pragmatists)


"And the council here is useless. They don't get any German courses, they're housed in sports halls, can't make a contribution, because it's not allowed." (Economic pragmatist)

8.2. Long-term Outlook for Refugees

On the question about the **long-term outlook** for refugees in Germany, there is an unequivocal picture in the population (see Figure 22): More than 70 per cent of respondents are convinced that refugees should leave Germany and return to their own countries as soon as the situation there has stabilised. This perspective reflects the experience of Germans with many refugees from the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s, who ultimately returned to their home countries. Only 17 per cent express support for refugees being able to live permanently in Germany. The rejection is clearest between Radical (97 per cent) and Moderate Opponents (90 per cent). Even Humanitarian Sceptics (72 per cent) and Economic Pragmatists (78 per cent) share those views. People in the Liberal Cosmopolitans segment are the only exception, more than half (55 per cent) of whom speak approvingly of allowing refugees to stay permanently in Germany – regardless of the situation in their countries of origin.

FIGURE 22: LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR REFUGEES

Question: In your opinion, should the refugees that Germany accepts...



Representation in per cent.
Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

However, a look at other demographic characteristics gives a differentiated picture: Men are significantly more convinced than women that refugees should be given long-term prospects. By contrast, women show greater uncertainty about this question. Young people between the ages of 18 and 30 are also significantly more likely to agree to a permanent perspective than people in other age groups. This is sharply rejected in eastern Germany: Here 76 per cent of respondents call for refugees to return to their countries of origin, while in western Germany only 71 per cent agree with this. The rejection of permanent residency is especially clear among AfD supporters: 96 per cent of these are convinced that refugees should return to their countries of origin as soon as the situation there has stabilised. Adherents of Alliance 90/The Greens speak most strongly in favour of a permanent residence for refugees in Germany (36 per cent).

The qualitative study of Economic Pragmatists and Humanitarian Sceptics also shows that both differentiate between refugees (see following quotes). Many of those polled assume that war refugees themselves have a strong motivation to leave Germany again once the war is over in order to build up their countries and continue their lives there. However, they are also sceptical about whether the war will end quickly. Focus group participants who believed refugees come to Germany for economic reasons assumed that they want to remain permanently in Germany in order to acquire a higher standard of living. This is sometimes rejected. As a whole, the participants in the focus groups see major political and economic uncertainty. There is an expectation that politicians should adapt to the various scenarios and draw up and publicly communicate long-term plans for refugees.

*"And there are some who are just fleeing war. But until the war has ended there, they won't go back. So the problem will always stay here, in Europe too."
(Economic Pragmatists)*

"The Syrians might also be happy to go back home. People will want to go back to their home. Build it up and create. (Humanitarian Sceptic)


8.3. Integration Conditions

In addition, research was done into people's attitudes towards social and cultural integration conditions (see Figure 23). There is unity across the segments about the importance of learning the German language. 90 per cent of all respondents consider it essential that the refugees learn German; in this, the differences between the groups are also rather minor. It receives the strongest approval in the Liberal Cosmopolitans group, 94 per cent of whom are convinced that refugees coming to Germany today should learn German. Even among people who would be classified as Economic Pragmatists and Radical Opponents, the approval rate is over 90 per cent. Although the lowest agreement was among Moderate Opponents, at 81 per cent, this is still a very high level.

No comparable degree of agreement between the segments exists for other integration conditions. For example, although more than one in two of those polled (53 per cent) call for recognising educational qualifications to enhance successful integration into the labour market, a majority (43 per cent) of Radical Opponents are against it. Moderate Opponents are largely undecided on this point, 41 per cent neither agree nor disagree in their answers. By contrast, the Humanitarian Sceptics, Economic Pragmatists, and Liberal Cosmopolitan segments are united and a majority approves. However, the agreement rate is highest among Liberal Cosmopolitans, at 84 per cent.

FIGURE 23: INTEGRATION CONDITIONS

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about refugees who are currently coming to Germany?



Representation of the Top 2 boxes (strongly agree / tend to agree) in per cent.
 Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
 Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

In respect of culture, opinion among the German population is also divided. This becomes especially clear on the question of whether the refugees currently coming to Germany **make the country more open** to new ideas or cultures. One third agrees, almost another third is undecided and one third does not believe this. The rejection is especially marked among radical (70 per cent) and Moderate Opponents (52 per cent). By contrast, almost one in two Humanitarian Sceptics (49 per cent) can neither agree with this statement nor reject it. Most Economic Pragmatists and Liberal Cosmopolitans are convinced that the refugees who are arriving lead to more open-mindedness and openness in Germany. However, the agreement values are significantly different. While 80 per cent of Liberal Cosmopolitans believe in the positive effect of the refugees on openness in Germany, this applies to only half as many Economic Pragmatists. This again reflects the understanding of integration among those polled, which says that refugees should first adapt to German culture.

Closely connected with this is the question of whether refugees should be encouraged to **maintain their own traditions**. Only 22 per cent of the German population share this opinion, 41 per cent are undecided and around one third reject it. As would be expected, there are also clear differences apparent between the segments. While a majority of Humanitarian Sceptics (61 per cent) and Economic Pragmatists (49 per cent) neither agree nor disagree with refugees maintaining their traditions, Radical (65 per cent) and Moderate Opponents (54 per cent) clearly reject it. Scarcely one in ten from both of these segments think that refugees should maintain their own traditions. Contrary to this, 60 per cent of the Liberal Cosmopolitans favour encouraging refugees to keep their own traditions. However, on this issue almost one third is undecided.

During the focus group discussions, the reasons behind the aforementioned rejections were discussed with the Economic Pragmatists and the Humanitarian Sceptics. Both groups spoke of a **need for respect**. Some of them have the impression that refugees are not open to learning the German language or accepting German values. Among those polled, this provokes resistance to opening themselves up to another culture. Respect is demanded from the refugees first. In the participants' view, the culture of the host country, in this case Germany, must have precedence and must be observed. Only then can there be openness to other cultures on the German side. Those polled express the view that Germany often adapts itself to its new citizens (e.g. removing pork foods from nurseries or permits to build mosques) and this does not always happen the other way round to the same degree. This results in disappointment and rejection as well as a feeling of being excluded in one's own country, which becomes clear from the following quotes.

"I also notice it in the nursery, there are foreign children there too. The food is all pork-free. There are even jelly bears without gelatine. So much for integration [...]. I must say, I now feel excluded in my own country." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

"I also think the culture of the host country has precedence. It must be accepted at least. They don't need to live it out." (Economic pragmatist)

"They don't need to be Christians or whatever. But it can't be that you're just left there as an unbeliever. My sister was with a Turk once; he wouldn't come when pork was on the grill. They live here and demand that we adapt." (Economic pragmatist)

"Actually every culture must be able to live its culture, but in such a way that it doesn't hurt others. They can live their [culture], but they must also accept that we have another culture. I believe acceptance, respect, would help more." (Economic pragmatist)

8.4. Interim Conclusion

As a whole, **Liberal Cosmopolitans** show the greatest open-mindedness on the integration question: For example, a majority assume that not only are immigrants making an effort to integrate, but also that refugees will integrate successfully into German society. In addition, almost the majority are in favour of refugees being allowed to remain permanently in Germany. They call for the recognition of educational qualifications, are convinced that immigration makes Germany more open-minded and also are not against refugees maintaining

their traditions. Thus Liberal Cosmopolitans, in contrast to the other segments, favour a multicultural social model.

More than three quarters of **Economic Pragmatists** are convinced that immigrants want to integrate into German society. At the same time, they show major scepticism about the success factor for integration of refugees. They reject a long-term perspective for refugees in Germany, but a clear majority supports the recognition of educational qualifications. Only a minority of Economic Pragmatists agree with the maintenance of traditions, although quite a few believe that immigration makes Germany more open to new ideas and cultures.

Humanitarian Sceptics are unsure of whether immigrants are making an effort to integrate, but scarcely any of them believe that integration will be successful. They do not expect permanent residency for refugees. The majority support recognition of educational qualifications, but successful integration is dependent on the cultural assimilation of the refugees, as Humanitarian Sceptics reject refugees maintaining their traditions. In addition, only a fifth believe that Germany is made more open by immigration.

Overall, the rejecting attitude of the **Radical Opponents** is apparent in relation to integration, where their negative attitude distinguishes them significantly from all other segments. For example, a majority of Radical Opponents do not believe that immigrants are making an effort to integrate, and only a minority consider successful integration of refugees to be possible. They speak out clearly against permanent residency for refugees and are almost unanimously convinced that refugees should leave Germany again as soon as the situation in their countries of origin has stabilised. A majority reject recognition of educational qualifications for integration into the employment market, as well as rejecting the idea of refugees maintaining their traditions.

As in other places, **Moderate Opponents** are relatively close to Radical Opponents in their views, but are not as emphatic in their rejection of integration. For example, more than twice as many are convinced that immigrants in general make an effort to integrate. However, just as few as the Radical Opponents believe in its success and also reject the idea of refugees being given permission to stay long-term in Germany. They just as clearly oppose the maintenance of traditions by refugees. German culture should remain as the dominant culture. Regarding the rejection of educational qualifications as well as the belief that immigration makes Germany more open-minded, they exhibit a somewhat less emphatic rejection.

9. Engagement and Activities in Support of Refugees

Successful integration does not only mean a one-sided adjustment by the immigrants; it also requires certain actions from the host society. Germans have demonstrated such a willingness, especially in response to the large refugee intake in 2015. People throughout Germany demonstrated when they greeted refugees at railway stations, supplied them with food and clothing and acted as translation assistants in dealings with authorities. Particularly in 2015, the media, by supplying moving images of scenes at railway stations, triggered a wide-ranging discussion about Germany's new "Welcome" culture. For this reason, the study asked questions about the attitudes of the population towards various refugee support activities.


As well as their **personal commitment** on behalf of refugees arriving in Germany, 40 per cent of all those polled indicate that they themselves have been actively involved **in the last twelve months** (see Figure 24). The most common activity is donating clothes or food, something that 27 per cent have done at least once. 8 per cent have volunteered time; just as many have donated money; and 6 per cent have signed a petition in support of refugees. 4 per cent have described positive experiences with refugees on the Internet and almost 1 per cent was ready to welcome one or more refugees into their homes. In relation to **planned activities for the coming months**, the same ranking is apparent as for activities already performed: While more than 22 per cent of all respondents plan to donate food or clothing for refugees, fewer than 10 per cent were planning to invest time in volunteer work or donate money.

If commitment is considered separately by segment, Liberal Cosmopolitans are the group with the highest activity levels (see Figure 25). For example, 44 per cent of them say they have donated food or clothing in the last twelve months. Almost as many plan to do so in the next year.


In addition, almost one in five Liberal Cosmopolitans have invested time in volunteer work to help refugees. The proportion of those who plan to do this in the future is even somewhat higher (24 per cent), while the proportion in the other segments is significantly below 10 per cent. Around 17 per cent of Liberal Cosmopolitans have signed a petition and just as many have given money to a charity. Only slightly fewer plan to do this in the next few months. The least commonly selected activity over all segments is welcoming one or more refugees into one's home.

FIGURE 24: ENGAGEMENT IN SUPPORT OF REFUGEES

Questions: Which of the following things, if any, have you done in the last 12 months to help refugees in Germany?
And which of the following, if any, do you think you will do in the next 12 months to help refugees in Germany?




Representation in per cent, multiple answers possible.
Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.



58 per cent of those polled have neither been engaged in any activity in the previous months nor plan to do so in the future. Although 5 per cent of respondents have not been actively involved they plan to be in the future. Although almost 11 per cent were active in previous months, they do not intend to carry out any further activity in the near future and a quarter of those polled were active in the past and plan to be so again in the future. In this respect, the liberals distinguish themselves: more than half (54 per cent) of them have already been active and plan to continue supporting refugees. They also include the lowest number (28 per cent) of people who, in the past as well as the future, have been inactive. Both the Opponent segments show the lowest past and future commitment. Unsurprisingly, as the high profile refugee crisis of 2015 becomes more distant from public memory, there has been a decline in enthusiasm for volunteering to support refugees.

FIGURE 25: ACTIVITY INDEX BY SEGMENT

Questions: Which of the following things, if any, have you done in the last 12 months to help refugees in Germany?
And which of the following, if any, do you think you will do in the next 12 months to help refugees in Germany?



Representation in per cent, own calculation.

Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common..

The question of which **factors** cause people to take action to help refugees is relatively clear: Media reporting about refugees proves to be the most important factor across all groups. One in two Liberal Cosmopolitans cite this as the decisive trigger and even 44 per cent of Radical Opponents and 33 per cent of Moderate Opponents felt moved to action by reports in the media. The smallest effect is ascribed to reports on Facebook and Twitter: People in all segments cite this as the least important aspect.

Alongside that, in the qualitative focus groups the Economic Pragmatist and Humanitarian Sceptic segments often cited **human need** as the most important motivator. The perception of the needs of women and children has an especially motivating effect, as these groups of people are considered to be more worthy of protection. The discussion also shows that personal contact and getting to know individual refugees increases motivation and the commitment to help. Through direct contact, the refugees' problems become tangible and their willingness to integrate becomes visible. Some barriers, fears or doubts are broken down. People develop a stronger empathy and appreciation of the need to support refugees.

Despite these motivating factors, the focus group participants also speak of barriers that hold them back from making an active personal commitment. These **barriers** lie, first of all, **in the respondents themselves**. For example, the persons interviewed say they have enough problems of their own; too little time or say that they have other priorities such as their own family. Problems already existing in Germany were also cited as a barrier, as some of those polled think that aspects such as child poverty and unemployment in Germany should be given priority. They see other obstacles in **unfavourable circumstances**. For example, one complaint was that it was not clear where and how help could be offered. A more powerful media presence, a central web page or telephone number would be desirable. In addition, negative media reports about refugees have put some people off. Some people put themselves forward for volunteer positions, but were rejected because there were already too many volunteers. Some of those polled tell of major disappointments in situations they, or people they know, have experienced personally (see quotes below). For example, support was given for German courses without - allegedly - the refugees who had signed up for the courses turning up. All of these factors trigger annoyances and disappointment and set off a debate about successful integration. In these

situations, those affected feel that they are not valued and lose the motivation to be involved. In the circle of acquaintances and family members, this acts as a negative multiplier.

"Where I would get involved and have done to some extent is with children. My daughter is at school in Neukölln. They've had various things going that I've got involved with. Children are the most helpless things there are." (Economic Pragmatist)

"At the start you felt sorry for them, you wanted to do a lot. But then soon afterwards through the media you could see how the situation was being abused." (Economic Pragmatist)

"The wife of someone I know worked in a refugee centre, so I got to know someone in the same age group, who was looking for somewhere to live. He now speaks good German. I thought it was good the way he got involved, he was learning. Then I said I'm looking for a flat. [I then suggested that] if you want to be my flatmate, make a contribution, we can look together." (Economic Pragmatist)

"I reconsidered it. I also made small efforts. But probably I wasn't with the right people." (Humanitarian Sceptic)


"There was a women's breakfast arranged with Syrian women. I would have been happy to go there. But then I heard, we have so many already." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

"A girlfriend of mine has an advertising agency, they somehow had time and collected donations. They only put obstacles in her way." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

People were also asked what they think of a **sponsorship programme for refugees** (see Figure 26). Programmes of this kind have been introduced in several federal states. In these programmes, specific groups (neighbourhoods, churches, schools) offer refugees support in settling into schools, work and the community, and thus take over some of the work of the central government. In total 45 per cent believe that Germany should consider introducing a programme of this kind, while one-third reject it. The rejection is particularly marked among women (34 per cent compared to 26 per cent of women). Agreement is higher among people with high levels of education (55 per cent) and people from urban centres (50 per cent). 25 per cent of all those polled were undecided. If agreement is considered separately by segment, a clear differentiation is apparent: For example, most of those in favour are Liberal Cosmopolitans, 80 per cent of whom think the Germany should consider introducing a partnership programme of this kind. Agreement is also relatively high among Humanitarian Sceptics; 53 per cent of these support a programme like this. At the same time, this group also contains the higher share of people who could not form an opinion (34 per cent). As would be expected, the lowest agreement values for this idea came from Moderate (23 per cent) and Radical Opponents (14 per cent).

FIGURE 26: SUPPORT FOR A SPONSORSHIP PROGRAMME

Question: Do you think Germany should consider introducing a refugee sponsorship program like this?



Representation in per cent.

Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

If Germany was to introduce such a programme, 22 per cent consider it very or quite likely that they would **personally participate in it**. However, two thirds consider it very or quite unlikely. It is least likely for middle-aged people between 40 and 50. Looking at the segments, clear trends are apparent: While 89 per cent of Radical and 85 per cent of Moderate Opponents consider it unlikely that they would personally participate in a sponsorship programme, more than half of the Humanitarian Sceptics (53 per cent) consider a personal commitment to be very or quite likely. People from the Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatist segments prove to be very similar on this question: 61 per cent of Economic Pragmatists consider it unlikely that they will personally participate.

In summary, there are moderate levels of support on the question of whether Germany should consider introducing a sponsorship programme for refugees. 45 per cent of all those polled support this, one third reject it and one quarter are unable to answer. Among all of those polled, personal commitment was below 40 per cent. Within this, one quarter have not only taken at least one refugee-support action in recent months, but also plan at least one action in the next twelve months. For 58 per cent, neither of the two applies. There is a reduced commitment for the future, as the level of those who showed support but don't plan to do anything in the future, is significantly above the level of those who have previously not done this, but plan to do so in the next few months.

Media reports about refugees have the strongest potential for mobilising people to engage in work to help refugees, while reports on social media appear to have the least. In the qualitative discussion, it is particularly the human need that emerges as the most important motivator. At the same time people cite a series of barriers that prevent them from getting involved. These include, alongside factors related to their own private lives, unfavourable circumstances and a general uncertainty about the various options for participation.

¹¹For example, for almost 40 years Canada has operated a private sponsorship programme for refugees, within whose framework both larger organisations as well as small groups of people are called on to support refugees in Canada in various ways. See: Government of Canada: Sponsor a refugee, unter: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/sponsor/index.asp>, aufgerufen am 20.12.2016. In 2016 the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative was formed to help other countries establish similar programmes. See: www.globalrefugeesponsorship.org

10. Empathy and Feeling of Obligation

The general public's willingness to accept refugees can also be influenced by various cultural or historical factors. This includes the question of whether refugees are welcome in a country like Germany, which itself has a history marked by persecution, flight and expulsion. Those historical factors contribute to a strong support for the principle of asylum in Germany.

Thus our data shows that 69 per cent of those polled think that people should be able **to seek refuge in other countries**. It is noteworthy that there are significant differences among the Opponent segments here: 49 per cent of Radical Opponents but only 38 per cent of Moderate Opponents think refuge in other countries should be an option. Agreement is especially high among Liberal Cosmopolitans (93 per cent) and Humanitarian Sceptics (80 per cent).

Germans demonstrate a stronger sense of obligation towards incoming refugees than many Europeans.¹² This can express itself in the belief that Europeans share responsibility for the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria – and thus the triggers of the refugee movement. This feeling of obligation is influenced by German history and culture, which dictate that people fleeing war and violence should be welcomed. Perceptions of Germany's favourable economic position also give rise to a special obligation to welcome refugees (see Figure 27).

82 per cent of the Liberal Cosmopolitans believe that Europe has a shared responsibility and that European countries must do their share in the refugee crisis and accept refugees. 88 per cent are also convinced that it is part of **Germany's history and culture** to accept refugees. The economic argument also convinces people from this segment, with 82 per cent agreeing with it. Economic Pragmatists and Humanitarian Sceptics also express an above-average feeling of obligation. More than half of the Humanitarian Sceptics and almost half of Economic Pragmatists are convinced of a German responsibility that arises from its history and culture.

Overall, the oldest generation, those between 60 and 70 years old, shows a significantly stronger feeling of obligation than people in other age groups. This applies to both the cultural and historical responsibility of Germany as well as a shared European responsibility for refugees. Furthermore, people with high levels of education are convinced Germany and Europe have a special responsibility to the refugees.

Humanity is the first **intrinsic motivation** to help people who have fled from war-afflicted regions. Many of those polled in the qualitative focus groups see this as their humanitarian duty because they imagine themselves in the same circumstances and would want support. However, over time this develops into a **feeling of obligation** that, many feel, is **externally** imposed. Many of those polled say that due to its history, Germany has a collective guilt which must be borne even today (see the following quotes).

"It's about the Third Reich. They want to claim that Germans are still collectively guilty and, because of that, have to conduct themselves towards the rest of the world in a certain way." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

"I have the feeling that it's not about the foreigners demanding that, but there's just such a collective awareness where it's said we have to accommodate them, especially from politicians." (Humanitarian Sceptics)


"It's more something that comes from we Germans, we've developed a consciousness, we need to ensure that they can also integrate well and for that reason leave aside some things in our culture." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

However, only one third of the population believes in an **economic and financial obligation** as a compelling reason for accepting refugees. People in the Moderate (64 per cent) and Radical Opponent groups (76 per cent) reject such a connection. Humanitarian Sceptics, however, are split on this question: 34 per cent agree there is an economic obligation, 35 per cent are undecided and one quarter reject it.

¹² Tent Foundation (2017) Tent tracker, Public Perceptions of the Refugee Crisis.

FIGURE 27: FEELING OF OBLIGATION

Question: And to what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
Please select one answer only for each statement.



Representation of the Top 2 boxes (strongly agree / tend to agree) in per cent.

Basis: Sample size = 2,002.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

However, people in Germany are united on the question of the effect of accepting a large number of refugees. For example, a majority of people across all segments are convinced that accepting a large number of refugees into Germany and Europe will lead to more people from countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq being encouraged to also come to Europe. But the segments differ significantly from one another in the strength of their conviction. For example, 87 per cent of Radical Opponents agree with this statement; among Liberal Cosmopolitans, agreement is only at 45 per cent. In this respect, Economic Pragmatists and Moderate Opponents are relatively close to one another: Almost three-quarters answer yes to the question. The large number of refugees accepted was a cause of concern in the qualitative discussion. According to those questioned in the Economic Pragmatist and Humanitarian Sceptic segments, there is fear and scepticism about whether integration can succeed.

In summary, it can be said that some Germans feel a special feeling of obligation towards refugees. In particular, Liberal Cosmopolitans as well as Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists believe in a shared European responsibility for the wars in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan and in Germany's special

obligation due to its culture and history. However, the idea of a special obligation due to the economic and financial situation of Germany is less persuasive. By contrast, people from the Opponent segments are united by the absence of a special feeling of responsibility. Age and segment are significant indicators: In particular, the oldest generation (between 60 and 70 years old) shows a significantly more marked feeling of obligation than people in other age groups.

11. Self-Perception of Germany in the World

The survey also probed questions of German national identity, including:

- Germany's role in the world, particularly in relation to globalisation
- The self-perception of Germans, and
- Attitudes towards Germany's refugee policy.

11.1. Germany's Role in the World

Only one third of those polled believe that the effects of **globalisation** are very negative for Germany. However, there are major differences between the segments. The majority of the Radical Opponents are of this opinion (65 per cent) and 42 per cent of the Moderate Opponents also share this view. Economic Pragmatists and Humanitarian Sceptics tend to disagree with this statement. Liberal Cosmopolitans strongly reject it: 58 per cent do not believe that globalisation has negative consequences.

However, 47 per cent of those questioned are still convinced that **today Germany must protect itself more strongly from the world**. Radical Opponents are more likely to have this opinion, at 80 per cent, followed by Moderate Opponents, at 59 per cent. Surprisingly, an above-average number of Economic Pragmatists (62 per cent) also believe Germany must protect itself more from the world. Humanitarian Sceptics and Liberal Cosmopolitans show the most open attitude: Only 27 per cent or 19 per cent share the view that Germany must do more to protect itself.

This is in keeping with the fact that **more than 50 per cent of Germans assume that Germany is losing its identity**. This opinion is especially strongly held by the Radical Opponents (83 per cent). 62 per cent of the Moderate Opponents and 51 per cent of the Economic Pragmatists also share this view. Liberal Cosmopolitans are the only segment in which a majority don't perceive the disappearance of German identity. Nonetheless, even among liberals, 24 per cent believe that German identity is being dissolved. Overall, barely one in two is **proud of their German identity**. This is especially marked among Economic Pragmatists, who at 57 per cent show the highest proportion of those who are proud of their German identity. The lowest agreement is among the Moderate Opponents (42 per cent) and Humanitarian Sceptics (43 per cent). Radical Opponents and Liberal Cosmopolitans are united on this question (48 per cent).

11.2. Self-perception of Germans

The survey highlighted anxieties about Germans' sense of their own country, despite Germany's strong economic performance compared to other European countries. When asked what **words best describe today's Germany**, a large number of those we questioned cited "fearful" (42 per cent) (see Figure 28). Variations range from 50 per cent among Liberal Cosmopolitans up to 31 per cent of Moderate Opponents. Economic Pragmatists and Humanitarian Sceptics agree, with 46 per cent and 43 per cent respectively. 38 per cent of Radical Opponents are convinced that "fearful" is an appropriate description for Germany.

More than one third of all of those polled think that Germany is "naive". This picture is especially marked among the Radical Opponents. 50 per cent of them share this opinion, followed by 41 per cent of Moderate


Opponents. Liberal Cosmopolitans are the exception, with 21 per cent. "Angry" is also one of the attributes that many of those polled considered to be an appropriate description for today's Germany: 30 per cent agreed with this. It is noteworthy that the Radical Opponents segment, at 38 per cent, contains proportionally the highest rate of participants in the study who believe that angry is an appropriate description for today's Germany. Among Liberal Cosmopolitans, it was only 23 per cent.

To the question of whether Germany can be described by the term "hostile", there is rough agreement between Humanitarian Sceptics, Economic Pragmatists and the Opponents. Between one fifth and one quarter share the view that Germany is hostile. This looks a bit more drastic among Liberal Cosmopolitans, who are most likely to feel Germany is hostile. At the same time there are significant differences between men and women: At 28 per cent, woman are more likely than men (22 per cent) to describe today's Germany as hostile.

Less than one fifth of those polled see Germany as "weak" (23 per cent). This is most likely to be true for the Opponent segments. Compared to the high levels of agreement for the attributes "fearful", "naive" and "angry", only 20 per cent of those polled see "open" as a good description for Germany. The term is also polarising: While 18 per cent of Radical Opponents are convinced that Germany is open, 32 per cent of Liberal Cosmopolitans are not. All other segments have similar answers. Further, only 19 per cent of those participating in the study think that "tolerant" is a good description for today's Germany. As before, the Liberal Cosmopolitans dominate here with 30 per cent. Radical Opponents are again on the opposite side of the spectrum. Only 10 per cent of them believe that the term tolerant is a good description of Germany.

FIGURE 28: ATTRIBUTES OF TODAY'S GERMANY

Question: Which of these words or phrases do you think best describe Germany today?
Please select as many as apply.



Representation in per cent.
Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

For 14 per cent of those polled, "welcoming" is the most appropriate attribute for Germany. There are few differences between the segments here. A small number thinks that Germany is "confident". Only 5 per cent of the Radical Opponents and 10 per cent each of the Moderate Opponents and Humanitarian Sceptics

describe Germany as confident. Economic Pragmatists and Liberal Cosmopolitans are the most likely to consider Germany confident (24 and 20 percent respectively).


For those polled, the least appropriate word is "optimistic", which only 11 per cent would use to describe Germany. Liberal Cosmopolitans are the most likely to choose this word but only a low 18 per cent, followed by the Economic Pragmatists. At 5 per cent, Radical Opponents are the least likely to perceive Germany as optimistic.

11.3. Attitudes towards Germany's Refugee Policy

An overwhelming proportion of Germans believe that the German government is either doing enough or should do more to assist refugees (72 per cent in total). Only 28 per cent think their government should be doing less. The segments differ significantly from one another, in particular between the two fringe segments. 60 per cent of Liberal Cosmopolitans think the government should do more to support incoming refugees. Only one third think the current activities are sufficient and only 3 per cent think there should be less. Opposed to them are the Radical Opponents, who want a reduction in refugee aid activities (47 per cent). 28 per cent are of the opinion that the current activities are sufficient and only 19 per cent call for them to be extended. In this both segments differ significantly from the Humanitarian Sceptics, Economic Pragmatists and Moderate Opponents, a majority of which are satisfied with the current scope of the federal government's activities. At the same time, one third each of the Economic Pragmatists and Humanitarian Sceptics call for an expansion of refugee support activities. However, Humanitarian Sceptics reveal a higher level of uncertainty: One in five are not able to evaluate the activities of the federal government (see Figure 29).

FIGURE 29: SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Question: Do you think that Germany's government is doing enough to help refugees that are coming to Germany or do you think it should do more or less?



Representation in per cent.
 Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
 Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

In light of the challenges of absorbing the recent large refugee intake, opinion is evenly split on whether **A Germany must close its borders to refugees**. 36 per cent agree and 37 per cent disagree. If we consider the segments individually, an interesting picture emerges: Only 10 percent of Humanitarian Sceptics are in favour of closing the border, and almost half (46 per cent) of the people in this segment are against it. The attitudes of

the Humanitarian Sceptics are similar to those of the Liberal Cosmopolitans: 9 per cent of them are in favour and 79 per cent of them are against closing the borders. Opinions among the Opponents are equally clear: 79 per cent of Radical Opponents and 61 per cent of Moderate Opponents call for the borders to be closed. Only 8 per cent of the Radical Opponents and 11 per cent of the Moderate Opponents are against it. The Economic Pragmatists are more evenly divided with 37 per cent for and 31 per cent against closing the borders.

In this respect there is a significant proportion of people in Germany who consider it too dangerous to allow refugees to come in as they believe that refugees pose a **significant terror risk**. 38 per cent of those polled agree with this statement. Radical Opponents are especially convinced of this, 81 per cent see the incoming refugees as a significant terror risk. Fear is relatively high even among Moderate Opponents (62 per cent). With 42 per cent agreement, Economic Pragmatists lie in the middle, while Humanitarian Sceptics (11 per cent) and Liberal Cosmopolitans (8 per cent) are the ones that agree less with this claim. These fears of refugees must also be seen in the context of the time the polling was done (20-27 September 2016), which was marked by recent severe terror attacks in Europe, such as the attack in Nice and the attack on several passengers in a regional train in Würzburg.

Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists who participated in the qualitative research highlighted five main expectations that they have of German politicians:

- Clear communication of a long-term plan
- Connected European registration system
- Rapid processing of asylum applications
- Equal punishment of crime
- Welfare benefits only under certain conditions

These expectations are reflected in the following quotes:

"As a citizen, I would like to see position statements from politicians about how they see the situation developing in the course of the years. I think it's good that the refugees are coming in a situation of need, but I also think that politicians need to think about what we can do with the refugees." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

"Politicians weren't assertive enough. There should have been rules. Very clear rules for anyone who comes here. It creates a perception of injustice when they pick on their own citizens and say, you can do this and that and not that." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

"Improve registration. Many of them lie to come here. We need to think about how we can tell them apart. Because many of them are registered multiple times. The system has to work better. Today they can communicate with one another, link up with each other. Across all of Europe." (Economic pragmatist)

"The laws that often exist, also apply, trust ourselves to apply them and thus make them credible." (Economic pragmatist)

"Benefits only in return for something. I don't know whether they get money or only services in kind, but then they need to do a German course or perform community service work. That's the other problem, they just sit around. They don't have to do anything here." (Humanitarian Sceptic)

11.4. Interim Conclusion

The segments differ significantly in their perceptions of German identity, globalisation, and refugee policy:

The **Liberal Cosmopolitans** view globalisation in generally positive terms and only a few think that Germany needs to better protect itself from the world. Liberal Cosmopolitans most often describe Germany as fearful. They reject the idea of closing the borders. In addition, they think the current refugee assistance activities of the federal government should be expanded.

The Opponent segments at the other end of the spectrum. **Radical Opponents** believe that globalisation has negative consequences for Germany and that Germany is losing its identity. They consider Germany to be weak and naive and at the same time angry. In their view, the scope of the federal government's refugee assistance activities must be significantly reduced. They see the incoming refugees as a significant terror risk and call for the borders to be closed. **Moderate Opponents** also foresee a loss of German identity and offer a negative assessment of globalisation. However, they are split in their evaluation of politics: On the one hand, a majority of Moderate Opponents are satisfied with the scope of the federal government's activities. On the other, a majority support closing of the borders.

Humanitarian Sceptics in general do not believe that globalisation is having negative consequences for Germany and do not see it as necessary for Germany to protect itself more from the world. In their view fearful is the most appropriate attribute to describe Germany at present. A majority are satisfied with the activities of the federal government and oppose closing the borders.

By contrast, although a majority of **Economic Pragmatists** do not believe that globalisation is having negative consequences for Germany, an above-average number of them believe that Germany is losing its identity and must better protect itself from the world. They are also the segment that feels the greatest pride in German identity. At the same time, they describe Germany as timid and naive. They are content with the scope of the federal government's activities to aid refugees. However, they are relatively undecided on the question of whether the borders should be closed.

12. Message Testing

The survey tested seven messages about their country's response to the refugee crisis. Respondents were asked to express their opinion about the number of refugees accepted in Germany. They then received messages covering various aspects, ranging from humanitarian to cultural and economic content. These messages were then to be evaluated according to their persuasive power and influence on what they believe should be the number of refugees that Germany accepts. The messages were tested both in the quantitative study and in qualitative research with two of the "conflicted middle" groups, the Humanitarian Sceptics and the Economic Pragmatists.

Considered overall, the messages that appealed to humanitarian as well as cultural values came off best. 57 per cent found **persuasive** the statement that if you had to flee horrible circumstances in another country you would want to find refuge in Germany. Another 55 per cent were convinced by the statement that people with a wide range of different backgrounds and creeds have been coming to Germany, and there is enough room for them all as long as they work hard, learn the language and contribute to society. Comparatively speaking, the statement with the lowest persuasive power, with 38 per cent agreement, was the one that said Germany, as a country with an ageing population, can profit from the arrival of younger workers (see Figure 30).


However, the various segments rated the persuasive power of the individual messages differently: As a whole, all messages were found to be very persuasive by the Liberal Cosmopolitans. Their strongest approval was for the message that refugees, in particular, had to suffer under extremists. For the Radical Opponents segment, the most compelling messages were the ones that had a humanitarian and cultural component, which, in each case, one third found to be persuasive. Unsurprisingly they were the least responsive on almost all questions. For the Moderate Opponents, Economic Pragmatists, and Humanitarian Sceptics, messages appealing to

humanitarian values are the most compelling. Furthermore, for Economic Pragmatists the cultural message is of equal weight with 63 per cent of them judging it to be persuasive.

The message testing, for clarity, is presented as follows: firstly, the graphs below include the message that was tested and the results from the quantitative survey (disaggregated). Then, the messages, their different parts, and their persuasive power are dissected and analysed according to the data from the focus group discussions.

FIGURE 30: EVALUATION OF THE MESSAGES

Question: Thinking about the information you just read, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?



Representation in per cent.
 Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
 Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.



The results of the quantitative survey were reinforced during the qualitative phase of the research. The Humanitarian Sceptics and the Economic Pragmatists rated the humanitarian and cultural/mutual compact messages more positively. The three other messages came off less well: "Common enemy", "Shelter from the storm" as well as "Extremism not unique to Islam".


The messages tested were built around the following themes:

- Shared Humanity
- Cultural/mutual compact
- Common enemy
- Shelter from the storm
- Extremism not unique to Islam

FIGURE 31: EVALUATION OF THE HUMANITY MESSAGE

Question: Thinking about the information you just read, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement:

IF I WERE FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY AND FLEEING TERRIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES, I WOULD WANT GERMANY TO OFFER ME PROTECTION.



Representation in per cent, multiple answers possible.
 Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
 Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.



The humanitarian message that imagined respondents themselves in the place of refugees and asked how they would want Germany to respond was the most persuasive message. It helps to break down the sense of refugees as different from the respondents. It also triggers a sense of national pride, with survey respondents commenting "If I heard that other people thought like that, I would be a bit proud of Germany" or "you can be proud of the fact that they all want to come here" (both Economic Pragmatists). The fact that Germany is a welcoming country allows Germans to be patriotic and in a manner that is positive and non-exclusionary. As a result, Humanitarian Sceptics also identify with this message because it confirms the image of Germany as a wealthy and developed country, "stable and secure", that is happy to accept and help "with open arms" (both Humanitarian Sceptics). The message also explains the legitimate reason for why refugees want to come to Germany. Economic Pragmatists, in particular, express this view.


Messages based on shared humanity, however, can be a double-edged sword. Germans are sensitive to growing inequality in their own country and some people are reluctant to receive refugees if they believe

that they will live under conditions that are incompatible with human dignity. "The refugees are poor people, but I cannot accept them if I have to house them in hangars not fit for human beings. I don't understand how something like that is possible" (Economic Pragmatist). If the message is formulated in a way that nudges thought in this direction, it can increase resistance to accepting refugees rather than promote welcoming them.

FIGURE 32: EVALUATION OF THE CULTURAL/MUTUAL COMPACT MESSAGE

Question: Thinking about the information you just read, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement?

FOR DECADES PEOPLE FROM A WIDE RANGE OF BACKGROUNDS AND CREEDS HAVE BEEN COMING TO GERMANY. AS LONG AS THEY WORK HARD, LEARN THE LANGUAGE AND CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIETY, THERE IS ENOUGH ROOM HERE FOR THEM ALL.



The message of a mutual compact between refugees and their host country also has resonance for most groups. This message emphasises German values and rules as well as their precedence over the culture of immigrants. Accepting German values and rules is the prerequisite for successful integration, suggesting that there are obligations on the immigrant and German solidarity is not a one-way street. "We've discussed it. Then when integration works there is a mutual benefit" (Economic pragmatist). **Religion and background are of secondary importance to many Germans if they believe that refugees accept the values and rules in Germany and show their willingness to integrate.**

While the emphasis on values is perceived as positive, other terms and attributes of the messages encounter some (emotional) resistance. The first phrase "For decades people of different backgrounds and creeds have been coming to Germany" appears to diminish the overall message and emphasises an immigration tradition in Germany that not everyone sees as positive and successful.

The qualitative group discussion of the messages suggested that a shorter statement, without the repetition of "different backgrounds and creeds" would be more effective. Furthermore, the word "hard" in "hard work"


provokes resistance: "That's a threat" (Humanitarian Sceptics), "Sounds a bit nasty" (Economic Pragmatist). Here "well" as in "work well" could be more effective. However, the final phrase is more contentious: "There is enough room for them all", "For me that's too unconditional. I don't like to sign blank cheques" (Humanitarian Sceptics). Both "enough room" and "for them all" are considered not credible and also not desirable. Overall, adjusting the formulation could create an even better message, for example: "For decades people from a wide range of different countries have come to Germany. As long as they work well, learn the language and contribute to society, we're happy to take them."

While both messages generated approval and acceptance in both target groups, the other two messages, in each case, only worked with one of the target groups and were rejected by the other. For example, "Common enemy" gains the highest approval rate among the Economic Pragmatists, but the Humanitarian Sceptics reject this message almost entirely. At the same time the message "Shelter from the storm" wins approval from the Humanitarian Sceptics but is rejected almost entirely by the Economic Pragmatists. Both messages are therefore not recommended. The causes of such different reactions need to be further explored in the future.

FIGURE 33: EVALUATION OF THE COMMON ENEMY MESSAGE

Question: Thinking about the information you just read, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement?

NO ONE WANTS EXTREMISTS TO BE LIVING IN GERMANY. BUT REFUGEES HAD TO SUFFER THE MOST FROM EXTREMISTS – ESPECIALLY REFUGEES FROM SYRIA AND IRAQ. MANY OF THEM HAD TO FLEE THEIR HOMES, LEAVE BEHIND THEIR FRIENDS AND FAMILY MEMBERS AND GIVE UP THEIR WORK. REFUGEES ARE NOT OUR ENEMY; THEY ARE THE VICTIMS OF OUR ENEMY.



Representation in per cent, multiple answers possible.
 Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
 Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.



From an initial look at this message, various aspects are strongly appealing to Economic Pragmatists. This especially includes the explanatory character of the message: The background to the flight is explained, which creates a better understanding of the reasons they are seeking asylum, greater acceptance of the flight to Germany and empathy with the refugees. "That reassures me and explains why they are all here" (Economic Pragmatist). At the same time the emphasis that help is being given to people who are really dependent on it is appealing: "That we're giving protection to those who're really in need" (Economic Pragmatist).

However, the message contains various components that are rejected by both groups, but which are given a much stronger weighting especially in the group of Humanitarian Sceptics. As they discuss this message, interviewees became less persuaded. Both groups, for example, made the criticism that there are many causes for flight, not only extremism and terrorism, e.g. also civil war, poverty, political persecution. "The text mixes terrorism up with civil war" (Humanitarian Sceptics), but also: "No one says they are all extremists" (Economic Pragmatist). From this perspective flight alone is not seen as solely caused by "our enemies". "They are not all the victims of our enemies" (Humanitarian Sceptic) or: "It's a patronising attitude to say who my enemy is" (Humanitarian Sceptic).

In addition, the Humanitarian Sceptics especially do not want to grant victim status to all those who have fled; they suspect, instead, that there are at least some (potential) perpetrators from the civil war-affected regions and, perhaps, terrorists here in Germany: "I'm concerned that something like Paris [terrorist attacks] could happen to us" (Humanitarian Sceptic). Completely separate from this, the message also prompted some participants to think about how refugees are not only driven out but are also attracted by Germany as a welfare state. In summary, this message tries to reduce complexity, but it is not as effective in reaching those two segments.

Statement – Shelter from the storm: WE ARE PROVIDING SHELTER FROM A STORM.¹²

Short, simplified messages are less common in German political discourse than in most English speaking democracies. The reduced complexity of the message "Shelter from the storm", which is apparent in its brevity and vividness, is also the reason for its rejection – especially by Economic Pragmatists. Particularly the imagery of a "Shelter from the storm" evokes associations with headlines from the German tabloid press and even slogans from the far-right scene: "Could also be on an NPD election poster" (Economic Pragmatists) or "populist" (Humanitarian Sceptic).


Economic Pragmatists, in particular, object to the lack of information about who is offering shelter to who and why. The rejection of the word storm is common to both groups, because it is unclear ("What does the [storm] relate to?" "To the masses of refugees?") (Humanitarian Sceptic), but above all appears too threatening: "We need to be afraid of that, barricade ourselves in and shut the doors" (Economic Pragmatist). In this sense the message evokes, especially in the Economic Pragmatists but also among Humanitarian Sceptics, exactly the opposite of what was intended: "The AfD could also take that. Exactly the opposite" (Humanitarian Sceptic).

¹² Die Aussage wurde erst nach Abschluss der quantitativen Befragung entwickelt und konnte daher nicht quantitativ getestet werden.

FIGURE 34: EVALUATION OF THE EXTREMISM MESSAGE

Question: Thinking about the information you just read, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement?

MANY RELIGIONS, INCLUDING CHRISTIANITY, HAVE ALREADY HAD PROBLEMS WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISTS IN THEIR OWN RANKS. WE MUSTN'T ALLOW OUR VIEWS ON ALL MUSLIMS TO BE SHAPED BY A FEW EXTREMISTS.



The message that extremism is not unique to Islam won the lowest approval from both groups. In fact, in both groups no positive aspects to this message are discussed, yet their weaknesses are: "I think that's crazy" (Humanitarian Sceptic), "Cheap" (Humanitarian Sceptic), "That's all just negative. Where is the positive in this?" (Humanitarian Sceptic), "Hard" (Economic Pragmatist). This may reflect the word structure of the message as well as the substance. One factor, in particular, is that the message sounds complicated: "I've had to read that several times now, because I don't [understand] the sense of the first phrase" (Economic Pragmatist).

In addition, even in its first clause, the message aims too sharply at a backwards-looking negative example from the history of Christianity and apparently promotes an acceptance of the current violence: "We had crusades and found it very bad, why should we now accept it from others? That is totally illogical" (Humanitarian Sceptic). The fact that the message also weights religion very strongly and tries to make parallels between Christianity and Islam is sharply rejected: "The problem is that today you hear about Muslims all the time, so I already have a certain bad feeling about them, and in the newspaper, I only read about attacks from them, killing themselves. Then I find it difficult to think that Christians have also done this" (Economic Pragmatist). In addition, the participants would like to see an emphasis on the active role of the German Muslim community, positioning itself against extremism: "What's missing is an active role for Muslims" (Humanitarian Sceptic). The tone of this statement can also prompt interviewees to feel that people are talking down to them. As a whole people feel a bit lectured. Compared to the other statements, this message is attributed to the left: "[That could] [come] from the Left to counter the rising tone from the far right" (Economic pragmatist).

Both in the quantitative and qualitative study, the messages which had a **humanitarian and cultural/mutual compact component were perceived as more compelling**. Although there are individual aspects of the messages

that could be modified, as a whole these statements are most persuasive. The extremism argument was met with clear rejection in the qualitative focus groups. Both Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists interpreted it as negative and complicated. By contrast, the two messages containing "Shelter from a storm" and "Common enemy" are interpreted very differently in the groups. Economic Pragmatists, in particular, are disturbed by the brevity and vividness of the "Shelter from a storm" statement, which, for them, lacks important information. By contrast, the "Common enemy" statement appeals to Economic Pragmatists especially because it provides more explanation, which is important for people in this segment.

12. Summary

This report demonstrates that despite an increasingly polarised debate around Germany's response to the refugee crisis, and a growing debate about German national identity, a large number of Germans still hold mixed views about the reception and integration of refugees into German society. Germans remain among the most supportive populations of immigration in Europe. Their sense of responsibility to people seeking protection from war, conflict and persecution remains strong, and for many this sense of responsibility is tied to their identity as Germans. Nevertheless, there is apprehension about the prospects for successful integration of Germany's newcomers, especially in connection with those from Muslim backgrounds, and notably among many Germans who believe that Germany did the right thing by taking in those refugees.

We hope that this research can inform the debate about public perceptions of refugee and immigration policy in Germany, convey how German attitudes towards these issues are evolving, and help shape further research efforts. It provides insight into genuine concerns among "middle" groups that are being provoked by the rise of populist anti-immigration parties across the world.

This research forms part of the larger More in Common initiative, which is a response to the growing and serious threats to open and inclusive societies that began in 2016. Organisations focused on migration, refugees and human rights that have traditionally led these public debates are struggling, with their limited capacities, to respond to a complex and rapidly changing environment in which the issues on which they work have gone from second-order to top-order issues on the political agenda.

New infrastructure is needed to respond to the increasingly sophisticated, well-resourced, and targeted communications strategies of far-right populist political parties and media organisations. This report provides nuanced information - particularly on the middle or conflicted segments - that can contribute to those new approaches.

More effective public engagement starts with a better understanding of the public mind-set. But beyond improving understanding of public attitudes, this initiative aims to support the creation of stronger civil society infrastructure, innovative communications and a public conversation that engages people more effectively. This is urgently needed if we are to turn the tide on the threats to open societies, and build welcoming communities that are both closer together and more inclusive.

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Appendix: Understanding of Migration Terminology

Immigrants are not a homogeneous group of people. Rather, there are major differences between immigrants and refugees. Far-right populist parties, in particular, do not differentiate between the various immigration groups. Even public discourse does not distinguish the terms sufficiently, despite the fact that a European migrant worker is significantly different from a Syrian refugee. This lack of clarity in usage prompted the United Nations Refugee Organisation (UNHCR), among others, to author a public opinion on the terminology and to stress that a distinction is required.


In this context, the study investigated the level understanding that the German population has of migration terms (see Figure 35). Those participating in the study were presented with various definitions to assign to the particular terms. In the course of doing this exercise it became apparent, somewhat surprisingly, that Germans have a relatively clear understanding of the terms. The overwhelming majority (86 per cent) define a refugee as "a person who has fled their homeland due to fears for their personal safety, often due to violence or war." At the same time, 42 per cent of those polled also considered the definition above appropriate for an asylum seeker. By contrast, significantly more (72 per cent) described an asylum seeker as "a person who leaves their country of origin and has officially applied to live in another country, but whose application has not yet been processed".

Most people understand an immigrant to be "a person who, for whatever reason, moves from one country to another, for example to Germany". By contrast, 72 per cent perceive "a person who moves from one country to another to improve their economic and career prospects" as an economic refugee. At the same time, 37 per cent are convinced that this definition also applies to an immigrant. In summary, we can say that the participants in our study have a good knowledge of the differences between the various terms and can correctly classify the definitions.

FIGURE 35: UNDERSTANDING MIGRATION TERMINOLOGY


Question: Please assign one or more of the terms below to each definition.

A PERSON WHO HAS FLED HIS OR HER COUNTRY BECAUSE THEY FEAR FOR THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY, OFTEN BECAUSE OF VIOLENCE OR WAR.




¹³ UNHCR (9. September 2015): UNHCR's perspective: 'Refugee' or 'Migrant' – Which is right? At: <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/de/pressrels/2015/unisinf513.html>, accessed on 8 December 2016.


A PERSON WHO HAS LEFT THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND FORMALLY APPLIED TO LIVE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY, BUT WHOSE APPLICATION IS STILL IN PROCESS.



A PERSON WHO MOVES FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER TO IMPROVE THEIR ECONOMIC AND PROFESSIONAL PROSPECTS.



A PERSON WHO MOVES TO A SPECIFIED COUNTRY, FOR EXAMPLE GERMANY FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY, FOR ANY REASON.



Representation in per cent.
Basis: Sample size = 2,002.
Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

Appendix: Uncovering the Public's Positive and Negative Associations with Refugees through Implicit Reaction Time (IRT) Testing

Using an Implicit Reaction Time (IRT) methodology, More in Common and Ipsos examined the strength of a number of different associations with refugees in the German public mind. The results showed that the German public overwhelmingly associates refugees with being courageous. However, they also showed a strong association with refugees as different from them.

Further nuance can be seen in our analysis of the 'conflicted middle' – two segments of public opinion that hold mixed views on refugees and refugee integration and which represent more than two fifths of the German public. The IRT test highlights key differences between these segments' deeply held associations with refugees. The 'Humanitarian Sceptics' are less likely than their 'Economic Pragmatist' counterparts, to associate refugees closely with being a threat to Germany and with being dishonest. The Economic Pragmatists also associate refugees with not being peaceful, which may relate to concerns they are reluctant to voice, such as anxiety about terrorism and about Islam. Campaigns targeted at changing perceptions of refugees will necessarily have to address the widely felt 'otherness' of refugees, as well as the specific concerns raised by narrower segments.

INTRODUCTION AND AIMS

What are the public's deeply held, unconscious associations with refugees – whether positive or negative? In this appendix, we give an overview of the results from an Implicit Reaction Time (IRT) test designed by More in Common and Ipsos to uncover how close a number of different associations are with refugees in the public mind. We outline key principles of the IRT method, before covering the overall findings from this experimental study. We then discuss how associations with refugees differ across the five different segments of the German public, which this research has uncovered, focusing on the two "conflicted middle" segments: The Humanitarian Sceptics (23 per cent of the German public) and the Economic Pragmatists (20 per cent of the German public). By way of conclusion, we summarise what the IRT test tells us about deep-seated beliefs about refugees among the German public, beyond what relying on survey and segmentation methods alone would show.

ABOUT THE IRT™ METHOD

Approaches using an Implicit Reaction Time methodology are increasingly used in social and market research, as well as in academia. Ipsos, in partnership with Neurohm, has developed an advanced version of this method, IRT™. The approach relies on measuring response time to questions of association in milliseconds.

IRT™ is based on the fundamental psychological principle that the brain holds an intricate network of neural associations, so-called "neural networks" that are based on personal perceptions and experiences. The method assumes that the more closely two concepts are associated, for example "Apple" and "innovative", or in this study, "refugees" and "courageous", the faster an individual will respond to acknowledge the two concepts when undertaking an IRT™ test. Conversely, when concepts are less closely associated, for example if there is a conflict between how you want to answer and how you actually feel, or the concept requires more thought to work out how we feel, what we want to say, or what we want to do, then response times will be slower. Through capturing this, IRT™ seeks to go some way to overcoming issues commonly faced during survey research, such as social desirability bias, by enabling capture of the strength of non-conscious associations when conflict exists, or participants have feelings that they are unaware of. This is particularly relevant in sensitive or controversial policy areas where it can be difficult to establish underlying public opinion.

Ipsos's IRT™ analysis approach is based on highly refined algorithms that calibrate individual response speeds, and eliminates biasing variables from the analysis. It takes into account that simply comparing response speeds to a question between individuals would be misleading, given the range of individual-level characteristics that can influence response speed. Ipsos's approach seeks to normalise for a range of factors, including:

¹⁴ <http://www.neurohm.com>

¹⁵ Social desirability bias can be defined as the tendency of the respondents of a survey or study to answer a question according to what is perceived as desirable by others, that is, as being socially acceptable.

- Motor skills (e.g. age, familiarity with computer);
- Computer processor and internet connection speeds;
- Speed of learning;
- Participant fatigue; and,
- Syllable length and the word length of each attribute.

In addition, our algorithmic approach also acts to eliminate erroneous responses, such as those where a participant appears to take too long to respond, indicating that they may have been interrupted or distracted, or participants who click through too quickly and with little range, indicating that they may have been disengaged, or mindlessly responding in order to more quickly reach the end of a survey.

Our analysis approach is based on exploring aggregated changes in reaction time, once calibration to each individual participant’s baseline response time profile has been applied. This avoids introducing bias from individual differences in response time into the analysis.


For further detail on how the IRT™ method was implemented for this study, please refer to the Approach to this study section later in this Appendix.

Overall findings: while Germans closely associate refugees with being “courageous”, they are also clear that refugees are different to them

The German public closely associates refugees with being “courageous”. More than two in five agree emphatically that this is the case, as illustrated in Figure 36 below.

FIGURE 36: POSITIVE ASSOCIATIONS WITH REFUGEES

Question: Refugees are...?




Representation in per cent.
 Basis: n=1.969 adults in Germany aged 18-70, fieldwork conducted 20-27 September 2016.
 Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

The public is more conflicted in regard to other positive associations such as “peaceful” and “hard-working”, however. Division is apparent in regard to whether refugees are closely associated with being peaceful. While a quarter of the public agree emphatically that refugees are peaceful, a further three in ten disagree emphatically that this is the case. The public are also divided as to whether refugees are hard working. On balance, however, the association that refugees are not hard working is more emphatic than the association that refugees are hard working.

Overwhelmingly, Germans do not see refugees as being similar to them; almost nine in ten disagree that refugees are “like me”, including a third who disagree emphatically (34 per cent). This indicates that refugees are seen as an “other” in the German public mind. Figure 37 below shows how closely the public associates each of the neutral and negative associations we tested with refugees.

FIGURE 37: NEUTRAL AND NEGATIVE ASSOCIATIONS WITH REFUGEES



Representation in per cent.
 Basis: n=1.969 adults in Germany aged 18-70, fieldwork conducted 20-27 September 2016.
 Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

Refugees being “a burden” is a powerful negative association for the German public, one which campaigners advocating on refugees’ behalf need to take seriously. However, the same cannot be said of other negative associations such as “dishonest” and “a threat to Germany”. The association that refugees are not dishonest or a threat to Germany is stronger than the association that refugees are either of these.


WHAT IRT TELLS US ABOUT THE “CONFLICTED MIDDLE” SEGMENTS

Our segmentation research has identified two segments occupying the “conflicted middle” of German public opinion on refugees: Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists. The Humanitarian Sceptics are typically unsure about the impact and benefits of immigration, but express a historical and moral obligation for Germany to accept refugees who are fleeing war and persecution. The Economic Pragmatists’ motivation is very different; they see the benefits of inward migration for the German economy, but are concerned about some of the cultural aspects of such migration.

Looking at how the IRT™ results map onto these segments, we can see that both segments closely associate

refugees with being courageous – as does the German public as a whole (see Figure 38 below).

FIGURE 38: THE “CONFLICTED MIDDLE” SEGMENTS COMPARED



Darstellung der emphatischen Zustimmung in Prozent.

Basis: n=1.969 Befragte in Deutschland zwischen 18 und 70 Jahren, Feldarbeit zwischen 20. und 27. September 2016.

Quelle: Umfrage von Ipsos im Auftrag von More in Common.

Both groups also make a close, emphatic association with refugees as different from them. In line with the moral obligation they feel for Germany to accept refugees, however, the Humanitarian Sceptics are more likely to make a close, emphatic association with refugees as peaceful than the Economic Pragmatists are. The Economic Pragmatists associate refugees more closely with the value of their labour. More make a close, emphatic association with refugees as hard working than their Humanitarian Sceptic counterparts do, which may relate to their belief in the importance of immigrant workers to the German economy.


If we look only at these segments’ explicit views, they tell us that both segments are divided on whether refugees are hard working or not. The IRT™ results allow us to go beyond this, showing that a higher proportion of the Humanitarian Sceptics make the emphatic, unconscious association that refugees aren’t hard-working than make the association that they are. Deep down, the belief that refugees aren’t hard working is more strongly held among this segment than the belief that they are. In contrast, the Economic Pragmatist segment is genuinely split on whether refugees are hard working, both on a conscious and on an unconscious level.

Turning to the negative associations with refugees, both the “conflicted middle” segments lean towards agreeing that refugees are a burden. This is the case both on an explicit, conscious level and on an emphatic, unconscious level.

On the remaining negative associations with refugees – “dishonest” and “a threat to Germany”, there are clear differences between the segments. The Humanitarian Sceptics tend to dismiss both of these negative associations with refugees; seven in ten disagree that this is the case, including almost four in ten who emphatically disagree.

FIGURE 39: KEY NEGATIVE ASSOCIATIONS

Question: Refugees are?



Representation in per cent.

Basis: n=1.969 adults in Germany aged 18-70, fieldwork conducted 20-27 September 2016.

Source: Ipsos poll commissioned by More in Common.

The Economic Pragmatists, however, are divided on both these negative attributes. The IRT™ results help to indicate how close the association between refugees and each attribute is. On balance, this segment leans positively regarding refugees' honesty and whether refugees represent a threat to Germany; on an emphatic, unconscious level, more disagree with each of these associations than agree with them. Nonetheless, this segment is less emphatic in their disagreement with either negative association than the Humanitarian Sceptics are. While the Humanitarian Sceptics are unsure about the impacts and benefits of immigration, they are overall more likely than the Economic Pragmatists to hold positive unconscious associations with refugees.

The IRT™ test also points to a disconnect™ between what the Economic Pragmatists say and with their unconscious associations with refugees. If we look at their explicit responses alone, our results suggest that this segment is split on whether refugees are peaceful or not. The IRT™ test, however, shows that on an unconscious level, those in this segment associate refugees with not being peaceful more than they do with being peaceful. This may relate to concerns that they are reluctant to voice, such as anxiety about terrorism and Islam.

CONCLUSIONS: THE VALUE OF IRT™

IRT™ adds value by going beyond participants' conscious answers to survey questions, to uncover their unconsciously held, emphatic associations. While on a conscious level the Economic Pragmatist segment looks split on whether refugees are peaceful, for example, the IRT™ shows that deep down, this segment is more likely to believe that refugees are not peaceful than that they are. In this way, IRT™ enables us to uncover deeply held associations that the public may be reluctant to voice, but are nonetheless powerful shapers of their attitudes towards refugees.

There are certain associations with refugees that are shared across the "conflicted middle" of German public opinion. Both 'conflicted middle' segments see refugees as courageous – but are also united in their view that refugees are a burden.

However, there are also associations with refugees that differ across the conflicted middle. While the Economic Pragmatist segment is more likely to associate refugees with being hard-working than the Humanitarian Sceptics' are, they are less likely to associate them with being peaceful. They are also more likely to associate refugees with being a threat to Germany and as dishonest.

As these findings illustrate, the IRT™ test enables us to build up understanding of key segments of the public and their deeply held, unconscious associations with refugees. In turn, this can inform communications, messaging and refugee advocates' efforts to campaign on refugees' behalf in the current tense climate of opinion in European countries such as Germany.

APPROACH TO THIS STUDY

Participants completed the IRT™ module as part of the wider online self-completion survey measuring attitudes towards refugees. First of all, participants undertook a calibration exercise, to establish their individual baseline response time profile, as detailed above. Following completion of the calibration module, participants were shown the short piece of text about refugees below, and asked to take their time to read this text fully before proceeding to the next screen.

A refugee is someone who is fleeing their home country because they fear for their personal safety, due to persecution, war or some other threatening situation.

In recent years, many refugees have made the journey to the European Union (EU), mostly by crossing the Mediterranean Sea or through Southeast Europe. Many have come from countries affected by war. This situation has been labelled the 'European Migrant Crisis' or 'European Refugee Crisis.'

Participants were then informed that they would see a series of separate screens, which would each contain a statement about refugees, and that they should indicate whether they agree or disagree with each statement. They were also instructed to respond as quickly as they could. Figure 40, overleaf, provides an illustration of the layout of this exercise.

FIGURE 40: ILLUSTRATIVE LAYOUT OF QUESTIONS AND RESPONSE CODES



Source: Ipsos.

Participants first completed the IRT™ exercise for eight positive attributes, before repeating the exercise for eight negative attributes. Following the analysis, and for the purposes of discussion, "Like me" (tested alongside the positive attributes) and "Different to me" (tested alongside the negative attributes) were treated as neutral attributes due to the possibility for individual participants to perceive these in different ways. The rationale for separating the positive and negative attributes was that positive and negative attributes are processed differently, with negative attributes generally requiring greater processing time overall. While there was a break between the two groups of attributes, participants were not told that attributes had been grouped

¹⁶ While it is possible to use a 5-point scale in an IRT™ exercise, for this study it was decided that it would be preferable to use a 2-point agree / disagree scale.

¹⁷ N.B. This figure illustrates the layout of each question on screen, but is not a screenshot of exactly how this would have appeared to participants.

into 'positive' and 'negative' attributes. Each set of eight attributes included three warm-up attributes, and one dummy attribute, to serve as further calibration, and were not analyzed as part of the study. The warm-up attributes were always the first three attributes viewed, anchored in a consistent order. The order of the test attributes (P4-P8, N4-N8) was randomized within each 'cell'.

The IRT™ exercise collected whether participants agreed or disagreed with each attribute, along with their response time for each. This allows two levels of analysis of response, explicit and emphatic. These key terms are defined within IRT™ studies as follows:

- **Explicit:** The explicit response is simply the proportion of participants who responded agree or disagree.
- **Emphatic:** This refers to the proportion of participants who responded quickly to a particular attribute, denoting a closer association between refugees and that attribute. An individual's response is determined to be emphatic based on individual-level calibration and analysis. For a response to count as emphatic it must be identified as being a quick response time for an individual (compared against their average response speed, and not the response speed of others in the study).

This means that for a study using a 2-point agree / disagree scale such as this, two key metrics can be analysed:

- **Explicit Agree %:** Proportion of all participants who agree, regardless of response time.
- **Emphatic Agree %:** Proportion of all participants who agree, and are classed as having responded emphatically, as defined above. The higher the ratio between the Emphatic % and Explicit %, the more widely and strongly held the association.

The same two categories can be analysed in relation to participants who disagree as well, which can be particularly insightful in studies such as this one, which seeks to explore associations between a concept and a series of positive and negative attributes.

¹⁸ Positive attributes were: deserving of protection, honest, good for Germany (warm-up attributes); good for the economy (dummy attribute); courageous, hard-working, like me, peaceful (test attributes).

¹⁹ Negative attributes were: violent, lazy, criminal (warm-up attributes); bad for the economy (dummy attribute); a threat to Germany, different to me, a burden, dishonest (test attributes).

²⁰ The IRT™ methodology requires a minimum of eight attributes per test cell, in this study there were two test cells (Positive and negative). Therefore, in addition to the three warm-up attributes a further dummy attribute, of which analysis was not desired, was included in each cell.



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